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Management Powers and Duties Under
California's Community Property
Laws: Recommendations for
Reform*
By CAROL S. BRUCHt
Equality in property matters has been slow in coming to married
people, even under California's community property regime. Despite a
model of economic partnership, it was 1975 before California moved to
a system of equal management and control.' Few changes were made,
however, to enhance the likelihood that the new theoretical equality
would in fact be carried out. Concerns for the ongoing success of busi-
nesses and for certainty in banking transactions, for example, have left
intact major areas in which the sole management and control of com-
munity assets by one spouse continues to be authorized. As a result, an
earning spouse who banks wages in an account held solely in his or her
name need not be concerned that the other spouse will have access to
those funds,2 and an entrepreneur's spouse has no more say about how
* @ 1982 Carol S. Bruch. This Article is the second of two works prepared by the
author for the California Law Revision Commission and is published here with the
Commission's consent. The first study, Bruch, The Definition and Division of Marital
Property in California Towards Parity and Simplicity, 33 HASTINGs L.J. 769 (1982),
proposes reforms in the definition of community property and in the rules for property
division at divorce or upon the death of one spouse. This Article was written to provide the
Commission with background information to assist the Commission in its study of this
subject. However, the opinions, conclusions, and recommendations set forth are entirely
those of the author and do not necessarily represent or reflect the opinions, conclusions, or
recommendations of the California Law Revision Commission.
t Professor of Law, Martin Luther King, Jr. School of Law, University of California,
Davis. A.B., 1960, Shimer College; J.D., 1972, University of California, Berkeley. The au-
thor expresses her deep appreciation to Allison Mendel and Diane Wasznicky, 1980 gradu-
ates of King Hall, and to Timothy Roake, Madeleine Weiss, and John Chasuk, 1981
graduates, for their fine research assistance. For their thoughtful comments on the manu-
script, she thanks Professors Homer H. Clark, Jr., Herna Hill Kay, and Stefan A. Riesen-
feld. Marc Alexander and Marilee Unruh's editorial assistance is gratefully acknowledged,
as is the financial support of the W.K. Kellogg Foundation's Public Service Research
Program.
1. 1973 Cal. Stat. ch. 987, §§ 14, 15 (amending CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5125, 5127 (West
1970), current version at id §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1982)).
2. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 851, 7601 (West Supp. 1982); id § 852 (West 1968); id § 11200
(West 1981).
November 1982]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the community property business is run, including the question of how
much capital is left in the business and how much is withdrawn by way
of salary,3 than before the 1975 reforms.
Although it is difficult to gauge how many spouses have been frus-
trated by the lack of recourse provided to them for problems in prop-
erty management, there is no question that a comprehensive scheme of
remedies is needed.4 Under the current statutes, only at divorce is relief
for improper management provided. It is unlikely that interspousal
remedies will often be pursued during an ongoing marriage; however, a
system that guarantees relief only in the divorce court surely enhances
marital breakdown. 5 In more than one state the realization that divorc-
ing spouses were better protected than married ones has prompted pro-
posals for broad-scale reform of marital property rights, including
rights for relief during marriage. Louisiana recently adopted major
amendments to its community property laws,6 and a Wisconsin propo-
sal to establish a new marital (community) property system has re-
ceived considerable legislative attention in recent years and is
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(d) (West Supp. 1982).
4. The State of California's Commission on the Status of Women has an expanding
file of letters from women who describe management problems. Interview with Pamela
Faust, Executive Director of the California Commission on the Status of Women, in Sacra-
mento (Sept. 10, 1980). One letter reads:
"Please send me available information on a married woman's rights to support for food,
housing, etc., while still married and how she can secure these without suing for divorce.
"If the husband puts all monies in [his] individual checking account and refuses to pay
for food, what recourse does the wife have?
"Also, if bill collectors, persons holding unpaid notes, demand payment can the wife
use property to pay and avoid going to court if the husband refuses and just continues to
spend all the income?
"Can a wife do anything to protect herself financially against an alcoholic husband-he
has a good job and still is able to hold his job but refuses any treatment and neglects respon-
sibility as a husband financially.
"Your help will be greatly appreciated. Thank you."
California Commission on the Status of Women, They Tell It Like It Is, CALIFORNIA WO-
MEN, Jan. 1980, at 10, col. 1;seealso id, July 1980, at 6. For the text of a second letter, see
infra note 29.
5. See text of letter supra note 4. This Article is based upon the assumption that
societal interests as well as human values are served in the preservation of marriages, even
those in which significant disagreements as to financial matters exist. It also assumes that
divorce will be promoted if it is the only avenue to redress economic injuries between
spouses or to free one spouse from the financially irresponsible behavior of the other spouse.
On the other hand, the disruptive potential of interspousal litigation is recognized, and
recommendations are made that would permit, but not force, interspousal litigation to se-
cure the substantive rights that are identified or proposed. See infra text following note 231.
6. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2325-2437 (West Supp. 1982), enacted by 1979 La. Acts
709. Extensive commentaries are contained in the Act.
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scheduled for reintroduction during the coming legislative session.7 Fi-
nally, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has begun consideration of a Uniform Marital Property Act, the
current draft of which contains interesting management and control
provisions.8 Because these measures have been carefully researched,
analyzed, and drafted, they will receive special attention in the follow-
ing discussion of needed reforms in California law.
Current Management Powers and Duties
Since 1975, the general management rule in California has been
that each spouse has the power to manage and control both that
spouse's separate property and all of the community property. 9 How-
ever, sole management is explicitly authorized for a community prop-
erty business,10 or if the other spouse has a conservator;" l it
additionally arises de facto under rules that require financial institu-
7. An early version of the proposal is found in 1979 Wisconsin Assembly Bill 1090,
Substitute Amendment 4, passed by the Assembly Judiciary Committee on February 19,
1980, and reported out of that committee to the Joint Committee on Finance on March 11,
1980. K. Curran, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, Memorandum Update on the
Marital Partnership Property Bill 1 (June 30, 1980); J. Weisberger, Marital Property Reform
in Wisconsin I (Mar. 1, 1980) (outline of the legislation prepared by Professor June Miller
Weisberger of the University of Wisconsin Law School). The Wisconsin State Department
of Revenue was directed to report to the legislature's Joint Committee on Finance by Janu-
ary 1, 1981 with forms and schedules for a joint state income tax return for married persons
in Wisconsin. 1979 Wis. Laws ch. 221, § 2046.
For convenience, citations to the Wisconsin legislation will be made to the section num-
bers that will eventually appear in the statutes if enactment is secured, not to the section
numbers of either the original bill or its amended versions. Because both the original bill
and its later versions present materials in numerical order according to the proposed statu-
tory numbers, this form of identification will permit quick access to both the proposed lan-
guage and to the statutes if enacted. A recent version of the Wisconsin proposal is found in
1981 Wisconsin Assembly Bill 370, Senate Substitute Amendment 1, which failed to win
approval in a 1982 floor debate. Its author, Representative Mary Lou Munts, plans to rein-
troduce the proposal during the coming session. Telephone conversation with Peg Davey,
staff assistant to Rep. Munts, Madison, Wisconsin (June 7, 1982).
8. See UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT (May 15, 1982 Discussion Draft). A par-
tial reading of an earlier submission draft took place at the July 1981 meeting of the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The first reading was
completed at the Commissioners' July 1982 meeting, and a second reading is planned for
July 1983. Two readings are required for adoption. Telephone conversation with William
Cantwell, Esq., Reporter for the Uniform Marital Property Act, Denver, Colorado (Dec. 9,
1982).
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(a) (West Supp. 1982).
10. Id § 5125(d).
11. Id § 5128; CAL. PRoB. CODE §§ 3000-3154 (West Supp. 1982).
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tions to deal only with named account holders.' 2 In yet other cases,
both spouses must agree on management decisions.' 3 Termed "re-
straints on alienation," these joint management provisions require con-
sent or joinder of both spouses for gifts of community property in any
form,' 4 for sales of community personal property for less than valuable
consideration,' 5 for sales or encumbrances of household goods or wear-
ing apparel of the other spouse or the parties' minor children,' 6 and for
sales, encumbrances, or leases for longer than one year of community
realty. '7
More general standards of management behavior are established
by two additional Civil Code provisions: Section 5125(e) imposes an
obligation of "good faith" upon a spouse exercising management pow-
ers,' 8 and section 4800(b)(2) authorizes a divorce court to award an
additional amount to an injured spouse as compensation for the other
spouse's deliberate misappropriation of community or quasi-commu-
nity property. 19 There is little case law to illuminate either the refer-
ence in section 4800 to deliberate misappropriation20 or the relatively
new "good faith" language of section 5125.21 While it appears that a
breach of the good faith obligation should constitute deliberate misap-
12. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 851, 7601 (West Supp. 1982); id § 11200 (West 1982); id § 852
(West 1968).
13. The controlling statutes, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5125 and 5127 (West Supp. 1982), are
set forth infra at notes 41 & 42.
14. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5125(b), 5127 (West Supp. 1982).
15. Id § 5125(b).
16. Id. § 5125(c).
17. Id § 5127.
18. "Each spouse shall act in good faith with respect to the other spouse in the manage-
ment and control of the community property." Id § 5125(e).
19. Notwithstanding the equal division rule of California Civil Code § 4800(a) (West
Supp. 1982), § 4800(b)(2) permits the court "[a]s an additional award offset against existing
property, [to] award, from a party's share, any sum it determines to have been deliberately
misappropriated by such party to the exclusion of the community property or quasi-commu-
nity property interest of the other party."
20. This section has been specifically considered in only two cases since the "deliber-
ately misappropriated" language was added. See In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366,
374-75, 618 P.2d 208, 212, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662, 666 (1980); In re Marriage of Schultz, 105 Cal.
App. 3d 846, 855, 164 Cal. Rptr. 653, 660 (2d Dist. 1980). Marriage of Moore is discussed
infra at note 39. However, there are numerous cases upholding reimbursement awards to
the community to compensate for a spouse's mismanagement. The basis of liability has not
been fully and consistently articulated, but appears to be grounded in fiduciary duties and
trust concepts. For a discussion of the case law, see infra note 35.
21. See In re Marriage of Smaltz, 82 Cal. App. 3d 568, 147 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1st Dist.
1978), which came to the sensible conclusion that a husband does not abuse his management
duties when he pays spousal support to his former wife out of his current earnings. In
Smaltz, the husband's support obligation was based entirely upon his current earnings, as he
had no separate property.
[Vol. 34
propriation, permitting a compensatory award to the injured spouse at
divorce, good faith alone may not provide a defense against a section
4800 misappropriation claim. In In re Marriage of Walter,22 decided
under the law in effect before equal management and control and a
statutory "good faith" duty were instituted, the court held that payment
of separate expenses with community property funds constitutes delib-
erate misappropriation, even if the managing spouse believes in good
faith that the property being consumed is his own separate property
and not community property. Thus, although section 4800's reference
to "deliberately misappropriated" on its face appears to be a more nar-
row ground for relief than the one provided by section 5125's good
faith requirement, it in fact imposes a form of strict liability when com-
munity funds are used for the separate benefit of one spouse.
Proposed Management Powers and Duties
Left totally unclarified by current law are the extent to which other
actions by one spouse may violate the statutory good faith management
duty and the nature of possible remedies during marriage for a spouse
injured by a violation of the Civil Code's management standards. Sev-
eral situations can be imagined in which a remedy might fairly be re-
quested to vindicate such marital property rights. If a spouse refuses to
reveal what community property he or she has, or in which form it is
being held, relief should be made available by way of an action for
disclosure. Further, if one spouse controls community assets in a busi-
ness or account that is subject to his or her sole management and con-
trol and refuses to make those assets or some reasonable portion of
them available to the other spouse for legitimate community purposes
(such as the payment of outstanding obligations), an action for access
to the community property for good cause shown should be authorized.
Moreover, a spouse whose name has not been included on the title of a
community asset should be able to insist that the title be corrected to
give notice of his or her ownership interest. On the other hand, if
spousal consent is required by statute but is withheld without good rea-
son, or if one spouse is unable to consent due to physical or mental
incapacity, procedures should permit a court to dispense with the con-
sent requirement for that transaction or course of transactions.
If there has been long-term mismanagement by one spouse, the
other spouse should be permitted to request that the couple's finances
be severed, or that the financially prudent spouse be made solely re-
22. 57 Cal. App. 3d 802, 129 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1st Dist. 1976).
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sponsible for the management and control of the couple's community
property. A division of existing community property and clarification
of the parties' obligations to existing creditors should be available in
conjunction with such litigation. If gifts or other transfers have been
wrongfully made, or if community property has been wrongfully ap-
plied to debts for which separate property was initially liable, the in-
jured spouse should have options available during marriage to require
that the other spouse's separate property or other community property
be used to redress the injury. Additionally, a number of remedies or
protections against third parties are in order that would not unduly in-
fringe upon their interests, yet would avoid serious hardship to one
spouse as a result of the other spouse's irresponsibility. These remedies
would include rights to rescind or to set aside unauthorized transfers of
community property and a right to insist upon a fair marshalling of
assets on behalf of the debtor when creditors' claims are satisfied. Fi-
nally, the mutual obligations and protections governing property man-
agement by spouses should extend into the post-divorce period for so
long as common property remains undivided by agreement or court
order.
The following discussion of marital property management and
control addresses these issues one by one, under the rubrics The Right
to Know, 23 The Right to Sound Management, 24 The Right to Partici-
pate,25 and The Right to Be Made Whole.26
The Right to Know
Surely one of the most basic attributes of property ownership is the
right to know the nature and extent of one's holdings. This principle is
well established in most areas of joint ownership, 27 but remains largely
unacknowledged as to marital property.28 Recent letters to the Califor-
nia Commission on the Status of Women have come from wives whose
husbands have placed their earnings in individual bank accounts, re-
23. See infra notes 27-33 & accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 34-219 & accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 220-31 & accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 232-48 & accompanying text.
27. See D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 252 (1973).
28. The only suggestion in California case law that such a right may exist at times other
than upon dissolution of marriage is found in Wilcox v. Wilcox, 21 Cal. App. 3d 457, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 319 (4th Dist. 1971), in which the court allowed the husband to sue his wife for restora-
tion of community funds she wrongfully withheld from his sole management. See infra note
33.
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fusing to divulge the extent of their assets.29 Although financial institu-
tions are properly precluded from releasing information on account
balances to those whose names are not on the signature cards, some
mechanism should be made available to permit one spouse to inquire
of the other as to their shared property.
Perhaps as a holdover from the days in which each spouse man-
aged his or her own earnings and the other spouse's interest was little
more than an expectancy,30 rights to disclosure in community property
states have developed primarily in the context of divorce litigation,
when the couple's final balance sheet is struck.3' Full implementation
of equal management and control rights will not be achieved until each
spouse is obligated to divulge to the other the assets under that spouse's
control, even if no request to divide them has been made. This rule is
included in both the Wisconsin proposal and the draft Uniform Marital
Property Act.3 2 Because it is for a court to resolve doubts about what is
29. One such letter reads:
"Is there anywhere in the legal rights of women that would say what and how a wife
could know what's right in the process of determining the income received from a husband?
"We've been married 16 years and I don't know anything about any savings or have my
name on any credit union savings.
"Would appreciate knowing my rights to income proportionally as he will not budget."
California Commission on the Status of Women, supra note 4, at 10, col. 2; see also id, July
1980, at 6.
30. The term "mere expectancy" was first used to describe a wife's interest in the com-
munity property in Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 311 (1860): "IT]he title to [common]
property rests in the husband. He can dispose of the same absolutely, as if it were his own
separate property. The interest of the wife is a mere expectancy, like the interest which an
heir may possess in the property of his ancestor." See generally Prager, The Persistence of
Separate Property Concepts in Calfornia's Community Property System, 1849-1975, 24
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 35-39, 47-52 (1976).
31. Such relief is expressly authorized at divorce by statute in Texas and in conjunction
with any interspousal property litigation in the draft Uniform Act. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
tit. 1, § 3.56 (Vernon 1975); UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 14(b) (May 15, 1982 Dis-
cussion Draft). Case law in several states has recognized the right in connection with termi-
nation of the community. See In re Marriage of Connolly, 23 Cal. 3d 590, 591 P.2d 911, 153
Cal. Rptr. 423 (1979); Boeseke v. Boeseke, 10 Cal. 3d 844, 849, 519 P.2d 161, 164, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 401, 404 (1974) ("By reason of his management and control, one spouse normally has
a fiduciary duty to account to the other while negotiating a property settlement agree-
ment .... [The duty] includes disclosure of the existence of community assets and material
facts affecting their value."); Sande v. Sande, 83 Idaho 233, 360 P.2d 998 (1961); Unser v.
Unser, 86 N.M. 648, 526 P.2d 790 (1974) (duty of disclosure terminates when the parties are
independently represented and dealing at arm's length in an adversary proceeding); In re
Yiatchos' Estate, 60 Wash. 2d 179, 373 P.2d 125 (1962). The term "accounting" sometimes
refers to an inventory of assets without also denoting a partition of the property. See gener-
ally D. DOBBS, supra note 27, at 252-54. See also infra note 35.
32. 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill 370, Senate Substitute Amendment 1, § 766.93(8) ("A
spouse may request. . . an accounting of marital property and debts or of separate debts
incurred prior to marriage.. . which affect marital property."); UNIFORM MARITAL PROP-
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separate and what is community property, this disclosure requirement
should extend to all assets, not just those that the managing spouse
concedes to be community property. Although it is possible that a
court would imply a right to disclosure from the present good faith
management provision alone, reasoning that for every right there must
be a remedy,3 3 statutory clarification is in order. If the new language
works as can be anticipated, litigation to compel disclosure will rarely
occur. Rather, a statutory provision that equal management and con-
trol provides both spouses with the right to be fully informed about the
community property will both obviate the current need for test litiga-
tion and encourage voluntary compliance.
The Right to Sound Management
Duty of Care
As noted, existing statutes express management duties in both gen-
eral and specific terms.34 The section 5125(e) requirement of good faith
management and the section 4800(b)(2) remedy for deliberate misap-
propriation can be seen as expressions of the more general doctrine of
fiduciary duty in confidential relationships that has developed in Cali-
fornia law,35 which expressly applies to interspousal contracts by way
ERTY Acr § 14(b) (May 15, 1982 Discussion Draft) ("In a civil action asserting a claim for
relief by one spouse against the other [for specified management wrongs], a spouse may...
be awarded an accounting of marital property and of the individual, premarital and marital
property debts of both spouses .... ").
33. Cf Wilcox v. Wilcox, 21 Cal. App. 3d 457, 98 Cal. Rptr. 319 (4th Dist. 1971) (hus-
band allowed to sue wife for restoration of community funds she wrongfully withheld from
his sole management, in an opinion citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3523 (West 1970): "For every
wrong there is a remedy."). Accounting or disclosure rights also appear to exist by implica-
tion under the statutes of Arizona and Louisiana and are expressly authorized by the Wis-
consin draft legislation. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-318 (West Supp. 1981-82) (permitting
divorce court, when dividing community property, to consider concealment, fraudulent dis-
position or destruction of the parties' joint property); LA. Civ. CODE AN. art. 2354 (West
Supp. 1982) (authorizing interspousal suit for fraud or bad faith in the administration of
community property); see also id art. 2341; 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill 370, Senate Substitute
Amendment 1, § 766.93(8), set forth in note 32 supra.
34. See supra notes 9-22 & accompanying text.
35. In delineating management duties between spouses, the courts have frequently
analogized to the law governing the relations of fiduciaries or partners. See, e.g., See v. See,
64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966) (duty of spouse commingling funds to
account for separate property); Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 364 P.2d 247, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 71 (1961) (husband who asked wife to discontinue adversary proceedings and prom-
ised to supply full and complete information concerning the community property had fiduci-
ary duty to account to wife during the property settlement negotiations); Williams v.
Williams, 14 Cal. App. 3d 560, 92 Cal. Rptr. 385 (2d Dist. 1971) (husband who liquidated
assets as dissolution was approaching held to duty to account for the community property);
Fields v. Michael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 443, 447, 205 P.2d 402, 405 (2d Dist. 1949) (in action
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of Civil Code section 5103.36 Clarifying language should be added to
section 5125(e) to negate any inference that the obligation to manage
and control is measured against a lower standard than that ordinarily
controlling the marital relationship37 or becomes inapplicable when
undivided community property is converted into tenancy in common
property by operation of law upon divorce. 38
Although greater clarity as to the meaning of section 4800(b)(2)
might also be useful, the present language could be fairly construed to
authorize compensation for damages caused by a breach of the good
against husband's estate to recover for his wrongful gift of community property to a third
party, the court stated, "It is clear that, being a party to the confidential relationship of
marriage, the husband must, for some purposes at least, be deemed a trustee for his wife in
respect to their common property."). How far this fiduciary duty extends has been ques-
tioned. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 14 Cal. App. 3d 560, 92 Cal. Rptr. 385 (2d Dist.
1971) (questioning whether a husband is liable to his wife for an improvident stock invest-
ment or whether a husband is required to be a meticulous bookkeeper). The California
Supreme Court has held that the fiduciary duty may end once the spouses are represented by
independent counsel in an adversarial situation. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Connolly, 23
Cal. 3d 590, 591 P.2d 911, 153 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1979); Boeseke v. Boeseke, 10 Cal. 3d 844, 519
P.2d 161, 112 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1974); In re Marriage of Hopkins, 74 Cal. App. 3d 591, 141
Cal. Rptr. 597 (2d Dist. 1977). For discussions of the correlation between this case law and
the legislature's attempts to codify management standards, see CALIFORNIA CONTINUING
EDUCATION OF THE BAR, ATTORNEY's GUIDE TO FAMILY LAW ACT PRACTICE 260-63 (2d
ed. 1972); Grant, How Much of a Partnership is Marriage?, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 249 (1971);
Prager, supra note 30, at 76-77; Comment, Toward True Equality: Reforms in Calffornia'r
Community Property Law, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 407 (1975); Comment, Caliornia's New
.Community Property Law-lts Effect on Interspousal Mismanagement Litigation, 5 PAC. L.J.
723 (1974); see also REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1969 JOURNAL OF
THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY 8062; Hayes, California Divorce Reform: Parting is Sweeter Sor-
row, 56 A.B.A. J. 660, 663 (1970).
36. California Civil Code § 5103 (West 1970) provides: "Either husband or wife may
enter into any engagement or transaction with the other, or with any other person, respecting
property, which either might if unmarried; subject, in transactions between themselves, to
the general rules which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with
each other as defined by Title 8 (commencing with Section 2215) of Part 4 of Division 3 [of
this Code]."
37. Although one court was under the impression that the good faith requirement had
obviated the fiduciary duty imposed by pre-1975 case law, it nevertheless applied old prece-
dent in a case involving fraud at the time of dissolution. In re Marriage of Brennan, 124
Cal. App. 3d 598, 604, 177 Cal. Rptr. 520, 523 (2d Dist. 1981).
38. The section, as amended, might read: "Each spouse shall act in good faith with
respect to the other spouse in the management and control of the community property, in
accord with the general rules which control the actions ofpersons occupying confidential rela-
tions with each other, as dejfned by Title 8 (commencing with Section 2215) of Part 4 of Divi-
sion 3. This duy shall extend to former community property that is converted into common
property by operation of law upon dissolution of the marriage until theproperty has been divided
by the parties or by a court of law." The proposed new language is italicized. This confiden-
tial relations standard is identical to that imposed by California Civil Code § 5103 (West
1970), which regulates the parties' contracts with one another. See supra note 36.
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faith management obligation (such as squandering), as well as for those
occasioned by an enrichment of one spouse's separate wealth at the
expense of the community estate.39 The need for redrafting should be
examined at the same time that broader questions of debt and property
division at divorce are resolved.40
Restraints on Acquisition and Alienation
Specific standards for good faith management can be inferred
from a number of other code provisions. First, Civil Code sections
512541 and 512742 impose restrictions on alienation by gift of commu-
nity personalty or realty, by sale of community household goods, cloth-
ing, or realty; and by encumbering or leasing community realty. These
39. The relation between California Civil Code §§ 5125 and 4800(b)(2) was involved in
In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980), a divorce
case in which the wife alleged that her husband had sold community property items taken
from their home without her consent and squandered the proceeds on his drinking habit.
Because there was no proof that the goods were sold for less than adequate consideration,
the California Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had erred when it found a
violation of § 5125, subdivision (b), which prohibits unilateral gifts or sales of community
personal property for less than adequate consideration. See infra note 41. However, it re-
manded the case for a finding as to whether subdivision (c), which requires written spousal
consent for a sale of community property household goods, was violated. The opinion ap-
pears to assume that any proved breach of the standards imposed by § 5125 would constitute
grounds for relief at divorce under § 4800(b)(2). Unfortunately, however, it does not discuss
whether Mr. Moore's use of the funds for excessive consumption of alcohol could establish
either a direct breach of § 4800(b)(2) as a deliberate misappropriation, or a violation of the
good faith management duty imposed by subdivision (e) of § 5125.
The current scope of § 4800(b)(2), including the degree to which it incorporates §§ 5125
and 5127, is particularly unclear as to two groups: putative spouses and those who have
moved to California from common law property states. These parties' rights could, how-
ever, be equated with those of married persons if recommendations made in the first study
are ultimately approved. See Bruch, The Definition and Division ofMarital Property in Cali-
fornia. Towards Parity and Simplicity, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 824-28 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Bruch, Definition and Division]. Should they not be, clarification by way of amend-
ment to §§ 4800(b)(2), 5125, and 5127 would be advisable.
40. See Bruch, Definition and Division, supra note 39, at 856-57.
41. California Civil Code § 5125 (West Supp. 1982) provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) and Sections 5113.5 and 5128,
either spouse has the management and control of the community personal property, whether
acquired prior to or on or after January 1, 1975, with like absolute power of disposition,
other than testamentary, as the spouse has of the separate estate of the spouse.
"(b) A spouse may not make a gift of community personal property, or dispose of
community personal property without a valuable consideration, without the written consent
of the other spouse.
"(c) A spouse may not sell, convey, or encumber the furniture, furnishings, or fittings
of the home, or the clothing or wearing apparel of the other spouse or minor children which
is community personal property, without the written consent of the other spouse.
"(d) A spouse who is operating or managing a business or an interest in a business
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provisions seek to ensure that both spouses agree to transactions central
to their well-being. Although generally satisfactory and consistent with
similar provisions in other community property states, 43 a few amend-
ments are recommended.
Section 5125(b) requires a spouse's written consent to transfers of
community personal property by gift or for less than a valuable consid-
eration.44 No other community property state imposes such a stringent
requirement. A similar writing requirement is imposed by section
5125(c) on sales of household goods and the wearing apparel of other
family members.45 In this time of United Fund campaigns at the office
and garage sales at home, these writing requirements are not realistic.
A court faced with an objection to customary transfers might find a
ratification of the gift or sale or an implied waiver of the writing re-
quirement, but there seems no sound reason to require such doctrinal
machinations. Other statutory models are available; none imposes a
writing requirement. Washington, for example, prohibits gifts of com-
which is community personal property has the sole management and control of the business
or interest.
"(e) Each spouse shall act in good faith with respect to the other spouse in the man-
agement and control of the community property."
42. Civil Code § 5127 provides: "Except as provided in Sections 5113.5 and 5128,
either spouse has the management and control of the community real property, whether
acquired prior to or on or after January 1, 1975, but both spouses either personally or by
duly authorized agent, must join in executing any instrument by which such community real
property or any interest therein is leased for a longer period than one year, or is sold, con-
veyed, or encumbered; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed
to apply to a lease, mortgage, conveyance, or transfer of real property or of any interest in
real property between husband and wife; provided, also, however, that the sole lease, con-
tract, mortgage or deed of the husband, holding the record title to community real property,
to a lessee, purchaser, or encumbrancer, in good faith without knowledge of the marriage
relation, shall be presumed to be valid if executed prior to January 1, 1975, and that the sole
lease, contract, mortgage, or deed of either spouse, holding the record title to community
real property to a lessee, purchaser, or encumbrancer, in good faith without knowledge of
the marriage relation, shall be presumed to be valid if executed on or after January 1, 1975.
No action to avoid any instrument mentioned in this section, affecting any property standing
of record in the name of either spouse alone, executed by the spouse alone, shall be com-
menced after the expiration of one year from the filing for record of such instrument in the
recorder's office in the county in which the land is situate, and no action to avoid any instru-
ment mentioned in this section, affecting any property standing of record in the name of the
husband alone, which was executed by the husband alone and filed for record prior to the
time this act takes effect, in the recorder's office in the county in which the land is situate,
shall be commenced after the expiration of one year from the date on which this act takes
effect."
43. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-214 (1976); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2346-55 (West
Supp. 1982); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West Supp. 1982).
44. See supra note 41.
45. See id
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munity property without the express or implied consent of the other
spouse,46 while the Louisiana statute requires consent only when a gift
is not "usual or customary" in view of the couple's economic status at
the time of the donation.4 7 The Wisconsin and Uniform Act drafts
require consent only when a gift is not "usual and customary. '48
Although there is some virtue in retaining a written consent re-
quirement for large gifts-with the expectation that courts will occa-
sionally find implied waivers and ratifications even in this restricted
area-it seems doubtful that any gift, however benign, will in practice
meet a written consent requirement except, perhaps, in the case of ma-
jor charitable donations. Nor is it likely that written consent will be
secured for sales of used household goods or clothing. A statute that
requires written consent, if enforced, will permit one spouse in most
cases to seek relief from such transfers of community property. Per-
haps in recognition of this fact, the Wisconsin proposal imposes a short
statute of limitations. 49 This solution, however, is problematical in that
one spouse will rarely challenge the other's mismanagement during an
ongoing marriage. In practice, remedies that require, rather than per-
mit, relief during marriage are apt to be more illusory than real.50
Statutes that recognize implied as well as express consents to gifts
and to sales of household goods and clothing seem best designed to
permit courts to reach sensible conclusions. Were California law re-
vised, it is doubtful that litigation would be more frequent than under
the harsh current rule, which invites evasionary equitable arguments.
Ambiguity could always be avoided when desired by securing the writ-
ten consent of the other spouse.
The section 5125 provision on management and control of a com-
munity property business5' also needs amendment. The policies that
support unilateral decisionmaking in the conduct of daily business af-
fairs do not extend to a decision to divest the community of its owner-
ship interest or to divest the business of substantially all of its assets.
Three states require that both spouses consent to the alienation of a
46. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030(2) (West Supp. 1982). See, e.g., Munson v.
Haye, 29 Wash. 2d 733, 189 P.2d 464 (1948).
47. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2349 (West Supp. 1982).
48. 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill 370, Senate Substitute Amendment 1, § 766.57; UNIFORM
MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 5(f) (May 15, 1982 Discussion Draft) (emphasis added).
49. 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill 370, Senate Substitute Amendment I, § 766.932(4) (one
year).
50. See supra note 5 and infra text following note 231. A better solution would restrict
recovery only to the degree necessary to protect justifiable reliance by the transferee. See
infra notes 238-42 & accompanying text.
51. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125(d) (West Supp. 1982). See supra note 41.
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community property business or substantially all of its assets, distin-
guishing these transfers from the normal purchases and sales during the
life of the concern that may be handled unilaterally by the managing
spouse.52 This joinder requirement seems sound and should be added
to section 5125, restricted by a statute of limitations to cut off claims of
bona fide purchasers without knowledge of the marriage relationship,
much as currently exists as to transfers of realty under section 5127.
Joinder of both spouses appears equally desirable in the converse
situation, when community property funds are used to purchase an in-
terest in realty or in a business that is to be managed or operated by
one or both of the spouses. Nevada and Washington both have such
legislation.5 3 Two policies support a rule of joint decisionmaking in
these situations. First, such acquisitions usually entail major financial
consequences for the family. Second, joinder is more likely to result in
the placing of both spouses' names on the title, enhancing protection
against a later unilateral transfer of the property to a bona fide pur-
chaser without notice of the marital relationship.5 4
A further joinder provision that recognizes the wisdom of joint
52. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2347 (West Supp. 1982); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 123.230(6) (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030(6) (West Supp. 1982). Under the
Louisiana statute, partnership interests are exempted from the joinder requirement. LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2352 (West Supp. 1982). The degree of restriction placed upon a
spouse who is a sole manager of the business under the Nevada and Washington statutes is
somewhat unclear. Although the statutes authorize unilateral acquisitions and sales in such
cases, they are restricted to those occurring "in the ordinary course of... business." Ac-
cord 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill 370, Senate Substitute Amendment I, § 766.61(1), (5)-(6).
The Wisconsin proposal requires written consent of both spouses "to any sale, lease, ex-
change, encumbrance or other disposition of all or substantially all of the marital personal
property, whether or not that property is owned in the name of only one spouse, used in the
operation of a business orfor an agriculturalpurpose. . . ." 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill 370,
Senate Substitute Amendment I, § 766.61(l) (emphasis added). The sale of real property
belonging to a business under the Wisconsin proposal, as under California law, is controlled
by the joinder requirement that applies to all community realty. Compare id
§§ 706.02(l)(fm), 766.51(2)(c), 766.61(2) with CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1982).
Joinder, under the Wisconsin draft, may be satisfied in three ways: signing the conveyance,
providing a written consent, or ratifying an improper sole transfer. 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill
370, Senate Substitute Amendment 1, § 706.02(1)(fm).
53. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230(4), (6) (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.16.030(4), (6) (West Supp. 1982). The Wisconsin proposal also requires joinder for
purchases of marital property real estate. 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill 370, Senate Substitute
Amendment I, §§ 706.02(l)(fm), 766.51(2)(c) (also providing that "[fMor the purposes of this
section, a mobile home used as a family home constitutes real property"). Protection of such
homes should be added to California Civil Code § 5127.
54. For a proposed independent remedy that would permit a spouse to have title cor-
rected to reflect an ownership interest, see infra text accompanying note 227. Should a
spouse wish to ratify an unauthorized acquisition, yet obtain the protection of having his or
her name included on the title, such relief would be appropriate.
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decisionmaking in matters of fundamental importance is suggested by
an early draft of the Wisconsin legislation. A 1979 version of the bill
would have provided that "the selection of a settlement or payment
option . . . upon retirement . . . shall require the written consent of
both spouses." 55 A similar rule should be incorporated into California
law.
Finally, some states have concluded that sound management is
more likely to occur when both spouses are required to participate in
agreements to insure, guaranty, or indemnify third parties.56 These
states recognize the special vulnerability of the community if its assets
are placed at risk under a contract in which ultimate liability depends
upon the behavior of someone other than the spouses themselves.
These protections, too, should be adopted.
Obligations to Others
Additional code sections indirectly establish management stan-
dards. For example, to the extent that debts are primarily payable
from one source of funds as opposed to another, legislative judgments
about spousal responsibilities can be detected. The following discus-
sion considers the interspousal implications of orders of satisfaction57
and the questions that arise when a single creditor seeks payment from
the parties' assets.58
Torts
The most explicit order-of-satisfaction provisions are found in
California Civil Code section 5122, which deals with liability to third
55. 1979 Wis. Assembly Bill 1090, Substitute Amendment 4, §§ 766.31(3)(a), 766.51(3).
It is unfortunate that the 1981 version would dilute this requirement. See 1981 Wis. Assem-
bly Bill 370, Senate Substitute Amendment 1, § 766.51(2)(f). Consideration should also be
given to a joinder requirement for the designation of beneficiaries under life insurance poli-
cies. See id § 766.62.
56. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-214(c)(2) (1976) (transactions of guaranty, indemnity, or
suretyship); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-4 (1978) (contracts of indemnity); 1981 Wis. Assembly
Bill 370, Senate Substitute Amendment 1, § 766.51(6) (requiring joinder for some contracts
of guaranty, indemnity, or suretyship; marital property is otherwise not implicated by the
agreement).
57. The Code sometimes directs that a debt be satisfied from one kind of property until
it is exhausted and only thereafter from another. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5122 (West
Supp. 1982). Because such provisions prescribe the order in which property is to be applied
to satisfy a debt, this Article refers to them as "orders of satisfaction."
58. This discussion does not deal with an allocation between creditors when multiple
claims are asserted that exceed in amount the value of the couple's liable property. Such
marshalling of assets for the benefit of creditors is beyond the scope of this Article.
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parties for a spouse's tortious conduct. 59 The section reflects the legis-
lature's view that tortious actions not undertaken while acting for the
benefit of the community should be the primary responsibility of the
tortfeasor, and not of the community. 60 In Arizona, such torts impli-
cate only the separate property of the tortfeasor.61 In contrast, Califor-
nia's rule is more protective of plaintiffs, making the community
property a back-up source of payment should the tortfeasor's separate
resources be insufficient to satisfy the claim.62 Similarly, the converse
rule, with primary liability in the community and secondary liability in
the tortfeasor's separate property, controls recoveries when the tort oc-
curred during activity undertaken for the community's benefit.
Although in need of a minor amendment to clarify the role of in-
surance proceeds and of quasi-community property,63 the statute repre-
59. California Civil Code § 5122 (West Supp. 1982) provides:
"(a) A married person is not liable for any injury or damage caused by the other
spouse except in cases where he would be liable therefor if the marriage did not exist.
"(b) The liability of a married person for death or injury to person or property shall
be satisfied as follows:
"(1) If the liability of the married person is based upon an act or omission which
occurred while the married person was performing an activity for the benefit of the commu-
nity, the liability shall first be satisfied from the community property and second from the
separate property of the married person.
"(2) If the liability of the married person is not based upon an act or omission which
occurred while the married person was performing an activity for the benefit of the commu-
nity, the liability shall first be satisfied from the separate property of the married person and
second from the community property."
60. Apportionment of liability, where appropriate, should be possible. Reppy, Debt
Collection from Married Californians: Problems Caused by Transmutations, Single-Spouse
Management, and Invalid Marriage, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 143, 183 (1981). For the sugges-
tion of a similar scheme and the recognition of a corresponding need for apportionment in
some cases, see the discussion of contract obligations infra at text accompanying notes 95-96.
61. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25.215.B (1976).
62. This rule is preferable to the somewhat confused rule developing in Washington
case law, where payment from a separate tortfeasor's one-half interest in the community is
now authorized once the tortfeasor's separate property has been exhausted. See the intelli-
gent critique of deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wash. 2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980), in Note, Commu-
nity Property--Washington Allows Separate Tort Recovery from Community Property, 57
WASH. L. REV. 211 (1981).
63. California Civil Code § 5122 should be amended to provide that insurance pro-
ceeds may be used to satisfy an indebtedness without regard to the source of funds used to
purchase the coverage. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5113(c) (West 1970) (containing such a rule as
to interspousal torts). A recommendation included in the first portion of this study would
replace quasi-community property with vested community property rights. If enacted, there
will be no need to amend § 5122 to specify where such funds fall in the satisfaction system.
See Bruch, Definition and Division, supra note 39, at 827-28. If not, § 5122 should be
amended to provide that quasi-community property funds belonging to the tortfeasor should
be resorted to after separate property but before community property in the case of a "sepa-
rate" tort, and after community property but before the tortfeasor's other separate property
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sents a sound balance between the interests of the tort plaintiff and
those of the uninvolved spouse.64 Without orders of satisfaction, pri-
mary responsibility on the part of one spouse or the community could
be imposed only through enactment of a statute defining the other
spouse's right to reimbursement when payments were made to the in-
jured party from one fund as opposed to another. Such a reimburse-
ment system would have serious shortcomings.
One can imagine a spouse who negligently causes an accident en
route to the airport to pick up his or her spouse, who is returning from
a business trip. Presumably the tort occurred during activity under-
taken for the benefit of the community, and the community property is
primarily liable. If the tort victim seeks recovery against the
tortfeasor's inherited jewelry or family farm, however, while commu-
nity assets are tied up in a business managed by the other spouse or in
savings accounts to which the tortfeasor has no access, it seems harsh to
force the tortfeasor to part with separate property and seek monetary
reimbursement from the other spouse, who refuses to pay out of solely
managed community funds.
While the tort victim's legitimate concern is with prompt monetary
recovery, the rules that look to the respective liabilities of separate and
community property recognize equally valid concerns of the spouses.
If recovery is permitted out of a business or inherited property, the de-
fendant's costs are emotional as well as financial. Given the sensible
legislative conclusion that some torts are more fairly seen as commu-
nity expenses and others as individual burdens, a humane enforcement
system would seek to support that distinction to the extent possible
while encouraging speedy payment.
Two remedies proposed in the following section, which deals with
the right to participate in management decisions, would complement
the existing satisfaction scheme. First, there should be a method for the
nonmanaging spouse to request access to community property funds
for good cause shown, such as to pay an obligation for which the com-
in the case of "community" torts. Because quasi-community property under current doc-
trine remains a spouse's separate property during marriage, the quasi-community property
of the nontortfeasor should not be included in any order of satisfaction.
64. The current rule seems overly harsh to the extent that it permits members of the
tortfeasor's family to be impoverished, perhaps for years, for behavior not undertaken on
their behalf. It encourages divorce as the only satisfactory means of protecting the
nontortfeasor's future earnings should the judgment be large in relation to the couple's cur-
rent assets and their earning capacities. Corrective legislation may well be in order. The
problem seems to lie less with the treatment of the family as an economic unit, however,
than with rules governing compulsory insurance, exemptions from execution, and the
nondischargeability of personal injury awards. Study of this problem is recommended.
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munity is primarily liable. Since the creditor is free to pursue that
source of assets, it is clearly appropriate to give a spouse the same re-
course. In this context, the spouse's action for access could take the
form of an action to direct the managing spouse to pay the tort victim
out of appropriate funds.65 If the creditor had not yet taken enforce-
ment steps, this would permit the tortfeasor to effect voluntary pay-
ment. If attachment had already been made against secondarily liable
property, satisfaction of the obligation pursuant to an access order
would dissolve the attachment.66 Second, the current rules on marshal-
ling of assets, which provide orders of execution when multiple credi-
tors have interests in the subject assets, should be clarified and adapted
to permit the defendant or the defendant's spouse to implement statu-
tory orders of satisfaction on his or her own behalf.67
Recovery possibilities will be enhanced at the same time that inter-
spousal rights are vindicated if a scheme of remedies makes clear that
community property will in fact be applied first when the community is
primarily liable. If stalling cannot ultimately change which property
will be held responsible for payment, the incentive to defeat the statu-
tory scheme through such tactics will have been removed. The margi-
nal benefit to a tort plaintiff in removing such orders of satisfaction
does not justify the harm to family members that would be condoned
by a repeal of section 5122. Whatever characterization of the tort is
required to implement orders of satisfaction might take place via a spe-
cial verdict in the tort case in which a married defendant is named 68 or,
65. See infra text accompanying notes 222-31.
66. See infra note 230 & accompanying text. Similar issues arise if a community prop-
erty home or business is executed upon despite the tortfeasor spouse's primary liability and
the tortfeasor refuses to make payment out of separate property beyond the management
reach of the innocent spouse. In seeking to protect the jeopardized community assets, the'
innocent spouse's right of access would take the form of a suit to direct the tortfeasor to pay
the obligation out of separate property to the extent possible. See infra text accompanying
note 225.
67. Development of a system of marshalling on the debtor's or the debtor-spouse's be-
half has been suggested in a student comment, The Implications of the New Community Prop-
erty Laws/or Creditors' Remedies and Bankruptcy, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 1610, 1624-28 (1975),
and endorsed by Professor Reppy. Reppy, supra note 60, at 193. For a proposal for such
marshalling, see infra text accompanying notes 228-31.
68. This option could be made available by permitting a spouse to intervene in a tort
suit pending against his or her spouse. To avoid extraneous issues that might cloud trial of
the liability question itself, however, a bifurcated proceeding would be required. Trial of
the characterization issue would take place only after the defendant's liability to the tort
victim had been established. This procedure would be efficient to the extent that the jury
would have already heard testimony relating to the question of whether the tort occurred in
connection with activity undertaken for the community's behalf, but has serious limitations.
First, difficulties would arise if witnesses who had testified in the earlier trial were not avail-
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preferably, whenever the issue first becomes relevant: in an action for
access, by way of a suit to stay enforcement of a judgment against cer-
tain assets; upon a motion for marshalling by either a creditor or a
spouse; or upon an interspousal suit for reimbursement if payment
from an improper fund (whether voluntary or involuntary) has been
made.69
Prenuptial obligations
Legislative views regarding relative spousal responsibility for obli-
gations to third parties other than tort liabilities are more deeply hid-
den. Close examination of Civil Code section 5120,70 which deals with
debts "contracted" before marriage, however, reveals another compro-
mise between family and third party interests. As clarified by the Law
Revision Commission's suggested amendments to section 5120, the ref-
erence to "contracted" debts is appropriately read to include all debts,
however incurred, that are attributable to the prenuptial period. 7'
A prenuptial creditor who seeks recovery during the debtor's sub-
sequent marriage is given access to the debtor's separate property and
to all of the community property except the earnings of the nondebtor
spouse.72 Rather than restricting access to the separate property and
able for the spouse's cross-examination. Next, intervention would have to be permissive
rather than mandatory to avoid forcing premature and perhaps destructive interspousal liti-
gation. See supra note 5 & infra text following note 231. Finally, only a relatively small
number of tort claims reach trial; other procedures would be required to resolve characteri-
zation issues following settlements.
69. If California Civil Code § 5122 is amended as recommended supra at note 63, no
order-of-satisfaction issues will arise if there is sufficient insurance to recompense the tort
victim's loss. As to uninsured liability, an order-of-satisfaction system can operate only if
the tortfeasor has both separate property and community property wealth. If only one fund-
ing source is available for payment of the obligation, no priority issue arises and no reim-
bursement rights should arise. See infra text following note 245.
70. Civil Code § 5120 (West Supp. 1982) provides: "Neither the separate property of a
spouse nor the earnings of the spouse after marriage is liable for the debts of the other
spouse contracted before the marriage."
71. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO LIA-
BILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY FOR DEBTS 22 (#D-312, Dec. 1, 1982 Staff Draft) (proposed
§ 5120.010). However, current support obligations to former spouses and to children of for-
mer relationships are not prenuptial obligations. The Law Revision Commission has made
an unfortunate tentative decision to recommend a change in the rule. The result would
disfavor these creditors in favor of others whose claims also arise during the current mar-
riage. See id. at 22-23, 25-26 (proposed §§ 5120.10, 5120.20, 5120.50). See also infra text
accompanying notes 102-11.
72. Again, the Civil Code does not specify what right to reimbursement, if any, exists if
the obligation is in fact paid from the exempted earnings of the nondebtor spouse. These
earnings are, of course, subject to the management and control of both spouses. See infra
text following note 245.
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earnings of the debtor spouse, which would continue into marriage the
same basic responsibility that existed prior to marriage, the law extends
the creditor's rights to all community property other than the earnings
of the nondebtor spouse. Thus, items acquired with exempted earnings
apparently are also available to the creditor.73 This potential windfall
is offset, however, by a possible disadvantage to the creditor that may
also accompany the marriage: if the debtor changes or reduces em-
ployment because of a changed family situation, there may be much
less property available for satisfaction than if the marriage and change
in career had not taken place. In an effort to maintain reasonable cred-
itor protection, while not unduly penalizing the institution of marriage
with a creditor's windfall, the legislature adopted the compromise of
section 5120. This balance seeks to assure the nondebtor spouse of
consumption at a standard commensurate with his or her current earn-
ings, subjecting only acquisitions from those earnings, other sources of
community property, and the debtor's separate property to liability for
the debtor's preexisting obligations.
In contrast to the tort provisions of Civil Code section 5122, there
is no requirement that such payments come first from the separate
property of the indebted spouse and only secondarily from the portion
of the community property that is liable for the debt. Yet there appears
to be widespread agreement among married people that a debtor
spouse's separate property and current earnings should be used to pay
-obligations that predate his or her marriage. To implement this view,
section 5120 should be clarified to expressly include all forms of obliga-
tion and an order of satisfaction should be added, making the debtor
spouse's separate property primarily liable, with the community prop-
erty other than the nondebtor's earnings only secondarily liable, at least
where creditor marshalling concerns do not arise.74 Finally, reformers
should consider whether the obligation of mutual support under sec-
tion 510075 justifies extending access to the nondebtor's earnings when
no other sources of separate and community property are available to
the creditor. This additional category of recourse would avoid the dan-
ger of "marital bankruptcy" that might otherwise attend the decision of
73. The section clearly protects the nondebtor's wages from garnishment but does not
specify at what point savings or purchases traceable to such earnings may be reached.
74. The extent to which this or other satisfaction schemes should be modified in order
to simplify the problems that arise under the rules of marshalling on behalf of creditors is
beyond the scope of this Article.
75. California Civil Code § 5100 (West 1970) states: "Husband and wife contract to-
ward each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity and support."
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a spouse to become a homemaker and ignore outstanding obligations. 76
Contract creditors
No general statutory provisions establish the relative responsibili-
ties of spouses for contract liabilities incurred during marriage other
than an order of satisfaction for necessaries, discussed below in connec-
tion with interspousal support obligations. 77 However, case law and a
specific code provision on educational loans have begun to fill the gap.
Two statutory changes and the responses to them outline this
development.
First, the adoption of mandatory equal division of community
property at divorce created difficulty with the treatment of a couple's
debts. Although it could have been argued that debts were not prop-
erty within the meaning of the equal division statute, the Judicial
Council created forms treating debts as subject to equal division.78
This assumption that debts constitute divisible property later crept into
the statutory language, which now calls for the valuation of "assets and
liabilities. . to accomplish an equal division of the community prop-
erty. . .. ,,79 The unfairness of an equal division of debt was immedi-
ately evident. For example, equal division of a debt incurred to finance
one spouse's education seemed harsh because the former student re-
tained the education, free of community property claims. Equally
troublesome were cases in which equal amounts of debt were placed on
parties who were far from equal in their abilities to repay, increasing
the likelihood of one party's bankruptcy. In response to these
problems, the legislature enacted a special statutory provision assigning
responsibility for educational loans at divorce solely to the spouse who
had received the education, 80 and case law simply ignored the per-
76. A related problem arises in the context of parental support obligations should the
child's parent cease working upon remarriage. See infra text accompanying notes 112-27.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 174-79.
78. Judicial Council of California, Forms Adopted by Rules 1281, 1282, 1285, 1286
(effective Jan. 1, 1970) (no longer in force). The same assumption has been carried forward
into the current forms. Id Rules 1281, 1282, 1285.50, 1285.55 (effective Jan. 1, 1980). See
In re Marriage of Fonstein, 17 Cal. 3d 738, 748, 552 P.2d 1169, 1175, 131 Cal. Rptr. 873, 879
(1976).
79. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1982).
80. Id. § 4800(b)(4) ("Educational loans shall be assigned to the spouse receiving the
education in the absence of extraordinary circumstances rendering such an assignment un-
just.") (added by 1978 Cal. Stats. ch. 1323, § 2). This rule resulted from a bill that, as
introduced, would have authorized much broader discretion for unequal division of debt:
"Debts for which the community property is liable shall be allocated to the respective parties
or ordered satisfied out of the community property as the court deems just and equitable,
taking into account the abilities of the parties to pay and the facts surrounding the transac-
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ceived equal division mandate to permit an unequal division of debt if
the couple's debts totalled more than their assets.8 ' No accommoda-
tion, however, has yet been made for less extreme situations. 2
A second statutory change rendered earnings received while
spouses are living "separate and apart" separate property.83 This rule
destroyed the earlier symmetry that had preserved both the community
property characterization of a husband's earnings and the community
property's liability for debts during periods of separation. 84 Instead,
community property liability for post-separation debts is permitted to
mount at a time when the community is receiving no earned income.
This anomaly has prompted a spate of cases dealing with the character-
ization of debts incurred during separation and with rights to
reimbursement.85
tion or occurrence which gave rise to the debt. Such allocation shall be without prejudice to
the rights of third parties." Cal. A.B. 3621 (Waters and Fazio) (1978); see also an amended
version of the bill, set forth in Bruch, Defnition and Division, supra note 39, at 857 n.360.
The legislative history and the placement of the educational loan provision within subsec-
tion (b) of § 4800 make clear that an unequal division of debt was intended in such cases.
See infra note 101 for a recommendation that a clarified version of the original proposal be
enacted.
81. See In re Marriage of Eastis, 47 Cal. App. 3d 459, 120 Cal. Rptr. 861 (4th Dist.
1975).
82. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Marx, 97 Cal. App. 3d 552, 159 Cal. Rptr. 215 (2d Dist.
1979);In re Marriage of Chala, 92 Cal. App. 3d 996, 155 Cal. Rptr. 605 (2d Dist. 1979). The
Chala court cites but does not apply Gay v. Gay, 146 Cal. 237,243,79 P. 885, 888 (1905), for
the proposition that outstanding debts for predivorce living expenses "can be ordered paid
so that future payments of spousal support will not be depleted by creditors demanding
payment of the spouse receiving the support award." 92 Cal. App. 3d at 1002, 155 Cal. Rptr.
at 608.
83. 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 1699, § 1 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 5118 (West 1970) to read:
"The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the
custody of, the spouse, while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the sepa-
rate property of the spouse."). For a discussion of the statute's many negative implications
for separated couples, see Bruch, The Legal Import of Informal Marital Separations: .4 Sur-
vey ofCalfornia Law anda Callfor Change, 65 CALIF. L. Rnv. 1015 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Bruch, Informal Marital Separations].
84. No statute terminates community property liability for the debts of either spouse
during separation. Before the 1971 amendment to CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118, a wife's earnings
but not a husband's became separate property following separation. Former CAL. Civ.
CODE § 5118, 1969 Cal. Stat. ch. 1608, § 8. The special rule for a wife's earnings dated to the
period when the wife had no management and control over her earnings unless they were
her separate property. It permitted an abandoned woman to obtain credit since her creditors
would have access to her earnings, while they would not if the earnings remained subject to
the sole management and control of her husband. 1849-50 Cal. Stat. ch. 103, § 9 gave the
husband sole management of all of the community property; a wife's power to manage her
own community property earnings was first granted by 1951 Cal. Stat. ch. 1102, § 1; see also
Bruch, Informal Marital Separations, supra note 83, at 1020-22.
85. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 592 P.2d 1165, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413
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Although it has long been the practice of some courts to character-
ize debts as either separate or community at the point of divorce,86 as is
consistent with the current dubious notion that debts are a negative
form of property subject to the dictates of equal division, California's
statutes do not mention such a process, and the cases are of little assist-
ance. 7 Much of the confusion can be traced to cases involving bor-
rowed funds. As between spouses, California has characterized
proceeds of a credit acquisition according to the "lender's intent" test.
88
When a lender relies upon existing separate property wealth in ex-
tending credit, the loan proceeds are seen as traceable to that wealth
and classified accordingly as separate property.8 9 If no such intent on
the part of the lender is discerned, the proceeds are characterized as
community property, a product of the general credit worthiness of one
or both spouses.90
If, under this test, credit produces community property assets, it
would appear logical to characterize the obligation to repay as a com-
munity property debt, at least for the purposes of property and debt
allocations between the spouses. This characterization, however, is of
remarkably little assistance in the fair allocation of debts at divorce.
(1979); In re Marriage of Cohen, 105 Cal. App. 3d 836, 164 Cal. Rptr. 672 (2d Dist. 1980); In
re Marriage of Marx, 97 Cal. App. 3d 552, 159 Cal. Rptr. 215 (2d Dist. 1979); In re Marriage
of Oldfield, 94 Cal. App. 3d 259, 156 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1st Dist. 1979); In re Marriage of Smith,
79 Cal. App. 3d 725, 145 Cal. Rptr. 205 (4th Dist. 1978).
86. See, e.g., Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967); In re Marriage of Walter, 57 Cal. App. 3d 802, 129 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1st Dist. 1976).
87. See, e.g., Somps v. Somps, 250 Cal. App. 2d 328, 340, 58 Cal. Rptr. 304, 312 (lst
Dist. 1967); Wong v. Superior Court, 246 Cal. App. 2d 541, 547, 54 Cal. Rptr. 782, 784 (2d
Dist. 1966) (dispute over whether husband's attorney's fees were community obligations: "It
is settled that the community property that must be distributed on dissolution of the commu-
nity by divorce is the residue that remains after discharge of the community obligations.
'Before a division of the community property can be made legally, the nature of certain
debts charged against the husband must be definitely ascertained. If it is determined that
they are community debts, then they should be deducted from the gross value of the commu-
nity property before a division is made.'" (citing 16 CAL. JUR. 2d, Divorce and Separation
§ 295, at 593)); Estate of Haselbud, 26 Cal. App. 2d 375, 383, 79 P.2d 443, 448 (4th Dist.
1938) ("[T]he record does not inform us of the nature or origin of the debts proved against
the estate. If they are debts incurred in behalf of the community manifestly the community
ought to contribute toward their payment.").
88. A chronicle and critique of California's doctrines concerning borrowed funds is
contained in Young, Community Property Classification of Credit Acquisitions in California:
Law Without Logic?, 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 173 (1981). A reform that would obviate the diffi-
culties caused by the current rule is proposed in Bruch, Definition and Division, supra note
39, at 857-60.
89. See, e.g., Estate of Ellis, 203 Cal. 414, 264 P. 743 (1928); Dyment v. Nelson, 166
Cal. 38, 134 P. 988 (1913).
90. See, e.g., Bank of California v. Connolly, 36 Cal. App. 3d 350, 111 Cal. Rptr. 468
(4th Dist. 1974); see also Ford v. Ford, 276 Cal. App. 2d 9, 80 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1st Dist. 1969).
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For example, a loan to enable a new lawyer to purchase an office li-
brary is typically given to one who has no separate property, with the
expectation that subsequent earnings will provide the funds for repay-
ment. Under the "lender's intent" test, the library is clearly community
property. However, the fair market value of the now-used books
(which is subject to division at divorce) will probably not offset the still-
outstanding debt, despite the library's foreseeably greater actual value
to the new practitioner over the life of his or her career. In these cir-
cumstances, equal division of debt unfairly burdens the non-lawyer
spouse.
Equally troubling are obligations incurred for the benefit of one
spouse's extramarital relationships, or for behavior that is detrimental
in other ways to the marriage or to the financial community. 91 Because
of the stress that accompanies marital disruption, such expenditures are
especially common in a period of separation, although they are by no
means restricted to this time period. Once again, case law has not yet
clarified the relevance of such factors at divorce.
Four important reforms together could bring order into this unset-
tled area. First, symmetry is needed between periods in which commu-
nity property is implicated by a spouse's actions and periods in which
earnings are denominated community property. Because parties do not
expect their marital property rights to be altered by informal marital
separations, nor to be subject to special rules in the absence of contrac-
tual or legal action on their part, earnings, like debts, should maintain
their community property character until an agreement or court order
terminates the community.92 In recent years, both the State Bar's Fam-
ily Law Section 93 and the Advisory Commission on Family Law to the*
Senate Subcommittee on Administration of Justice94 have endorsed
this proposal. It would obviate much of the unrest in the cases by
mooting the current question of reimbursement when separate property
earnings during separation are used to pay for continuing community
91. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662
(1980). For a summary of the case, see supra note 39.
92. For a recommendation that CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 be so amended and a discus-
sion of the problems of separated couples, see Bruch, Informal Marital Separations, supra
note 83,passim.
93. The Section supported Senate Bill 2038 (Sieroty), California Legislature 1977-78
Regular Session, which would have made this change in the Code, but has since changed its
position.
94. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON FAMILY LAW TO THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, SUBSTANTIVE FAMILY LAW PRoPos-
ALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 7 (Final Report 1979).
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obligations. Under the proposed reform, both the earnings and the ob-
ligations would be characterized as community.
The second important change would replace the lender's intent test
with an inquiry similar to that suggested above with respect to
tortfeasors for assigning priority in payment during marriage. 95 Was
the obligation incurred for the benefit of the community, or for one
spouse's individual benefit? Gambling debts or excessive debts for con-
sumption of alcohol, which might currently be characterized as ex-
penses incurred in violation of the good faith obligation to manage
community property and hence be subject to unequal division as delib-
erate misappropriations, would be more directly characterized as sepa-
rate obligations. Normal living expenses, on the other hand, would be
incurred for community benefit whether or not the couple was cohab-
iting. In some cases, of course, it would be necessary to characterize a
single transaction as serving both community and individual needs.
Permitting apportionment would greatly facilitate equitable results. 96
The third reform is related to interspousal management obliga-
tions in relationship to third parties. Extension of the order of satisfac-
tion currently imposed for tortious conduct 97 to contractual obligations
would make more concrete the obligations of good faith management 98
while retaining creditor access to both community and separate prop-
erty funds during marriage for the satisfaction of all debts incurred by
the spouses. The rights to access and to marshalling on behalf of the
debtor discussed above in relation to tort liabilities99 should be made
similarly available under the proposed rule.
Finally, broader authorization for unequal division of debt, simi-
lar to that recently considered by the Law Revision Commission,1t° is
needed. The provision should, however, look not only to the rights of
95. See supra notes 59-64 & accompanying text.
96. A similar apportionment problem exists in the torts areas, where a tort committed
by an entity that is owned partly by the community and partly by separate property may
require apportionment for order-of-satisfaction purposes under California Civil Code
§ 5122 (West Supp. 1982). See supra note 60 & accompanying text. Compare Texas law,
which contains a flexible satisfaction system that directs the court to consider "the facts
surrounding the transaction or occurrence upon which the suit is based" in determining the
order of execution against the parties' separate property and the community property. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5-62(b) (Vernon 1975); accord UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY AcT
§ 9 (May 15, 1982 Discussion Draft).
97. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 5122 (West Supp. 1982), set forth supra at note 59.
98. See id § 5125(e) (West Supp. 1982), set forth supra at note 41.
99. See supra note 96, describing the Texas and Uniform Marital Property Act ap-
proach, applicable to all forms of debt, and text accompanying notes 59-69.
100. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 71, at 18 (proposed
§ 4800(b)(5)).
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creditors and the parties' relative abilities to pay, but also to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the inception of the debts-those very circum-
stances that should be used under new orders of satisfaction to
determine the relative liabilities of the separate and community prop-
erty for payment of the couple's obligations.101
The seeming vagueness of the suggested test is deceptive. All theo-
ries aside, it is relatively easy to agree as to which debts are appropri-
ately borne by which spouse in a concrete situation. A rule permitting
the court to focus on the questions of when and for what purpose a debt
was incurred, or by whom the continuing benefits of the proceeds are
being enjoyed, or who has the earning capacity that realistically per-
mits repayment of the obligation, is less apt to inspire appellate activity
than are the often unfair, sometimes conflicting, and largely incoherent
standards of the current statutes and case law. When nothing indicates
that a particular debt should be borne by one party or the other, the
court would be expected to assign the debt in a fashion that reflects the
parties' relative abilities to pay. Substantial equity would be the re-
sult-a significant improvement on current law. In addition, the cur-
rent post-divorce debt collection litigation and bankruptcy actions that
reflect unfair and unrealistic debt allocations at divorce would decrease
in number.
Support for children and former spouses
Under California law, a child is entitled to share in the standard of
living of its parents; Civil Code section 4807 accordingly authorizes a
court to look to all forms of parental wealth and apportion the respon-
sibility for child support among them as it deems just. 0 2 The rule ap-
plies whether the children are offspring of the current marriage or of
some prior relationship.10 3 Although a child from a former relation-
101. Interim relief through addition of the following language to Civil Code Section
4800(b) is recommended: "Debts are not property subject to the rule of equal division of
community property set forth in subdivision (a) but are to be divided as set forth in this
subdivision. Debts for which the community property is liable shall be allocated to the
respective parties or ordered satisfied out of the community property as the court deems just
and equitable, taking into account the abilities of the parties to pay and the facts surround-
ing the transaction or occurrence which gave rise to the debt. Such allocation shall be with-
out prejudice to the rights of third parties." For more comprehensive reform suggestions that
would also affect creditors, see Bruch, Defnition and Division, supra note 39, at 857-60. Cf.
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.62(b) (Vernon 1975); UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT
§ 9 (May 15, 1982 Discussion Draft).
102. California Civil Code § 4807 (West 1970) provides: "The community property, the
quasi-community property and the separate property may be subjected to the support, main-
tenance, and education of the children in such proportions as the court deems just."
103. See Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 433 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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ship may be a prenuptial creditor to the extent that support arrearages
exist for prenuptial periods,"°4 the child should not be considered a pre-
nuptial creditor as to those support obligations that accrue during a
parent's subsequent marriage. Instead, support is properly seen as a
continuing obligation, with courts looking to current circumstances in
setting the amount due. No support liability is imposed directly on a
stepparent by virtue of the marriage alone; however, the degree to
which that person's income or wealth frees the child's parent to contrib-
ute to the child's support from his or her own assets is seen as rele-
vant. 105 Also relevant are the parent's own wealth, income or ability to
earn, and responsibilities to others. 10 6
Public policy supports this approach. A new spouse is appropri-
ately expected to accommodate expectations of familial wealth to the
needs of the other spouse's pre-existing family. In many cases, of
course, only community property of the current marriage is available to
pay support to children from a former relationship. In these cases, ex-
clusive responsibility for the parent's contribution to their support must
rest with this source of wealth, and payment of this obligation is en-
tirely consistent with a spouse's good faith obligation to manage and
preserve the assets of the current marriage. Any other rule would dis-
courage the voluntary payment of support awards. 0 7 For the same
reason, the nonparent should have no automatic reimbursement right,
either during or upon the termination of the marriage. Reimbursement
would mean that for every dollar of support paid (one-half of which
represents the community property share of the nonparent), an addi-
tional payment of one dollar (one-half of which belongs to the natural
parent) would have to be made to the nonparent to recompense the
104. See supra note 71 & text accompanying notes 71-76.
105. Gammel v. Gammel, 90 Cal. App. 3d 90, 153 Cal. Rptr. 169 (2d Dist. 1979); accord
Fuller v. Fuller, 89 Cal. App. 3d 405, 152 Cal. Rptr. 467 (5th Dist. 1979) (income and prop-
erty of nonmarital partner relevant to modification of child support).
106. See In re Marriage of Loehr, 13 Cal. 3d 465, 531 P.2d 425, 119 Cal. Rptr. 113
(1975); Pencovic v. Pencovic, 45 Cal. 2d 97, 287 P.2d 501 (1955); Meagher v. Meagher, 190
Cal. App. 2d 62, 11 Cal. Rptr. 650 (Ist Dist. 1961); Woolams v. Woolams, 115 Cal. App. 2d
1, 251 P.2d 392 (1st Dist. 1952); Kyne v. Kyne, 70 Cal. App. 2d 80, 160 P.2d 910 (1st Dist.
1945); Halle v. Halle, 25 Md. App. 350, 333 A.2d 360 (1975).
107. Even without this disincentive the nonpayment of support is a problem of major
proportions. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, Series P-23, No. 84, DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND CHILD SUPPORT (June
1979); D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY (1979); Carrad, A Modest Proposal to End Our
National Disgrace, FAM. ADVOC., Fall 1979, at 30; Seal, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce,
FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1979, at 10; Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Stan-
dards and Empirical Patterns for Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12
U.C.D. L. REV. 471, 499 (1979).
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support payment's diversion of that stepparent's one-half dollar. Since
ability to pay, not one-half the ability to pay, is the test for support
obligations, a rule of reimbursement on these facts would raise the
specter of impoverishment to the obligated parent, discouraging volun-
tary compliance with outstanding support orders. To the extent that
separate property wealth, however, is the basis for the support award,
payment out of that wealth is appropriate, and a stepparent should be
protected by orders of satisfaction as to the payment source and by
reimbursement rights, as in any case where payment from one source
versus another is directed by law. 08
At the same time, there is no reason to preclude children in their
capacity as creditors from reaching all of the community property as
well as their parent's separate property, subject to the marshalling
rights of their stepparent. Civil Code section 199, undoubtedly uncon-
stitutional as discrimination favoring nonmarital children, provides
that the children of a former marriage may execute only against their
parent's separate property and earnings, and not against other sources
of community property.10 9 Even if freed of its discriminatory language,
the statute would be unsound. Access to all sources of community
property in such cases is not tantamount to imposing a support obliga-
tion upon the stepparent. Such access simply recognizes that a parent's
continuing support obligations are legitimately enforced against the
same sources of funds as are other obligations incurred during mar-
riage by that spouse, subject to the court's existing authority to mar-
shall assets."10
This analysis of child support obligations applies with equal force
to support obligations owed prior spouses. The same policies that en-
courage the payment of pre-existing, continuing child support obliga-
tions during an obligor's subsequent marriage encourage realistic
creditor access and interspousal responsibility rules for obligations to
prior spouses. Here, too, the new spouse should be required to share
108. See Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967);
accord In re Marriage of Smaltz, 82 Cal. App. 3d 568, 147 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1st Dist. 1978).
109. Civil Code § 199 (West 1982) provides: "The obligation of a father and mother to
support their natural child under this chapter, including but not limited to Sections 196 and
206, shall extend only to, and may be satisfied only from, the total earnings, or the assets
acquired therefrom, and separate property of each, if there has been a dissolution of their
marriage as specified by Section 4350." The California Attorney General has concluded
that § 199 unconstitutionally discriminates against legitimate children since it restricts the
community property that may be reached by children of a former marriage to a parent's
earnings, while illegitimate children are not so restricted. 59 Op. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 15, 17
(1976).
110. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4807 (West 1970), set forth supra at note 102.
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extended-family burdens to the degree that support orders are based
upon the obligor's current earnings. Section 4807, which permits a
court to apportion responsibility for a child support award between the
obligor's various forms of wealth, should be extended to payments for
the support of a prior spouse, codifying case law that has already
reached this result."'
One final area of support obligations to third parties needs reform.
Confusion about the nature of community property interests, and a de-
sire to reduce the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
eligibility of children living with their stepparents have inspired two
highly inarticulate Civil Code provisions, sections 5127.5112 and
5127.6.113 Each was designed to reduce a child's projected need under
AFDC eligibility tests by imputing to the custodial parent an ability to
contribute to the child's support.l"4 The model obviously in the mind
111. See Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 562-63, 432 P.2d 709, 711, 63 Cal. Rptr.
13, 15 (1967). For a discussion of interspousal support obligations during an ongoing mar-
riage and a suggestion that the statute also be extended to this area, see infra notes 174-79 &
accompanying text.
112. Civil Code § 5127.5 (West Supp. 1982) provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 5125 or 5127 granting the husband the
management and control of the community property, to the extent necessary to fulfill a duty
of a wife to support her children, the wife is entitled to the management and control of her
share of the community property.
"The wife's interest in the community property, including the earnings of her husband,
is liable for the support of her children to whom the duty to support is owed, provided that
for the purposes of this section, prior support liability of her husband plus three hundred
dollars ($300) gross monthly income shall first be excluded in determining the wife's interest
in the community property earnings of her husband.
"The wife may bring an action in the superior court to enforce such right provided that
such action is not brought under influence of fraud or duress by any individual, corporation
or governmental agency.
"A natural father is not relieved of any legal obligation to support his children by the
liability for their support imposed by this section and such contribution shall reduce the
liability to which the interest of the wife in the community property is subject."
113. Civil Code § 5127.6 provides:
"Notwithstanding Section 5127.5, the community property interest of a natural or adop-
tive parent in the income of his or her spouse shall be considered unconditionally available
for the care and support of any child who resides with the child's natural or adoptive parent
who is married to such spouse. The amount arising from such duty to care for and support
shall be reduced by the amount of any existing previously court ordered child support obli-
gations of such spouse.
"Any contribution for care and support provided by a spouse who is not a natural or
adoptive parent of the child shall not be considered a change in circumstances that would
affect a court ordered support obligation of a natural or adoptive parent for that child."
114. Zumbrun, Momboisse & Findley, We/fare Reform.- California Meets the Challenge,
4 PAC. L.J. 739, 778-79 (1973) (discussing CAL. CIv. CODE § 5127.5); see also ASSEMBLY
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, 1979-80 REGULAR SESSION, BILL
DIGEST FOR A.B. 381, at 1-2 (Hearing Date: May 2, 1979); ASSEMBLY COMM. ON HUMAN
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of the drafters was that of a housewife with children in her care from a
former relationship, no current earnings, and a husband with a com-
fortable community property income. When first enacted, section
5127.5 provided an inappropriate remedy for the woman's then-ex-
isting lack of management power over her husband's earnings. Appar-
ently unaware of the community property rule that management of the
community denotes management of the entire property rather than
management of a spouse's one-half interest, and concerned that no sup-
port obligation be imposed on the stepparent, the statute's drafters gave
the children's mother management powers over "her one-half" of the
community property. The section's confusing language and the lack of
clarity as to its purpose have undoubtedly insulated it from needed re-
form in the years since. Left untouched when equal management and
control was enacted, the section has become even more disreputable,
appearing now as a form of gender discrimination.' 5
The penultimate blow to the scheme was delivered in July 1979,
when Camp v. Swoap 1 6 was decided. The case held section 5127.5 in-
effective as a means of limiting AFDC eligibility under the tests estab-
lished by the federal program because the stepparent support
obligation it was seen as imposing was not a general obligation of sup-
port, but rather applied only in some cases. 17 For reasons that are no
more clear than other aspects of the section's history, however, the sec-
tion was not repealed despite its many apparent deficiencies. Instead,
section 5127.6 was added to the code as part of a welfare reform pack-
age.' 8 The new section recognizes that equal management and control
entails the power of one spouse to dispose of the community property
earnings of either, but maintains the section 5127.5 quagmire of appar-
ent partition. At the same time, it reveals its continued AFDC concern
with the otherwise mysterious statement that a stepparent's earnings
RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, 1979-80 REGULAR SESSION, BILL DIGEST FOR A.B.
381, at 1-2 (Hearing Date: Apr. 17, 1979) (discussing CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.6).
115. The discrimination, given current management rules, operates against women. It is
the mother's one-half interest in her husband's earnings that is subjected to the support
obligation. There is no corresponding burden placed upon a father's share in his wife's
earnings.
116. 94 Cal. App. 3d 733, 156 Cal. Rptr. 600 (3d Dist. 1979).
117. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a)(1) (1980) (setting AFDC standards) requires that: "The de-
termination whether a child has been deprived of parental support. . . will be made only in
relation to the child's natural or adoptive parent, or in relation to the child's stepparent who
is ceremonially married to the child's natural or adoptive parent and is legally obligated to
support the child under State law of general applicability which requires stepparents to support
stepchildren to the same extent that natural or adoptive parents are required to support their
children." (Emphasis added).
. 118. 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 1170, § 2.
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are "considered unconditionally available" for the care and support of
any child who resides in the stepparent's home. 119 More telling than
this gentle rewrite of a section that had already proved ineffective was
the legislature's contemporaneous repeal of Civil Code section 209,
which had made express the California rule that a stepparent is not
liable for a child's support. 120
It is time to address directly questions of stepparent support obli-
gations and to place in perspective the perceived opportunity for unfair
access to welfare. California's perhaps still-existing rule that a steppar-
ent is not liable for support (although support amounts actually con-
tributed are presumed to be gifts and therefore not subject to
reimbursement)' 2 ' is based on sound policy. Any imposition of legal
responsibility for the children of one's spouse in the absence of adop-
tion would create a negative dower. That is, a parent would bring lia-
bilities into the marriage beyond those associated with his or her own
support. The result would be a disincentive to marriage that would
increase nonmarital cohabitation by couples with children of prior
relationships.
Unfortunately, the asserted impropriety of a family receiving pub-
lic support funds for children of a parent married to someone with cur-
rent income shifts attention from its proper focus: the responsibilities
of the child's own parents, only one of whom is in the household in
which the child resides. Section 5127.6 displays some recognition of
this problem; it purports to make the stepparent support that is taken
into account for AFDC purposes irrelevant if the issue is one of sup-
port rights against the noncustodial parent.' 22
119. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.6 (West Supp. 1982), set forth supra at note 113 (emphasis
added).
120. 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 1170, § 1.3. Former Civil Code § 209 had read: "A husband is
not bound to maintain his wife's children by a former husband; but if he receives them into
his family and supports them, it is presumed that he does so as a parent, and, where such is
the case, they are not liable to him for their support, nor he to them for their services." CAL.
CIV. CODE § 209 (West 1954) (repealed 1979).
121. Although Civil Code § 209 was repealed, no language imposing a duty of support
upon stepparents was enacted. At common law there is no obligation on the part of a step-
parent to support. H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 6.2, at 188-89 (1968).
122. It is only partially successful. Although the section provides that stepparent sup-
port actually provided "shall not be considered a change in circumstances that would affect
a court ordered support obligation of a natural or adoptive parent for that child," it does not
prevent a court from taking such support into account when there is an independent change
in circumstances that would justify a modification of support. In AFDC cases it is unlikely
that the noncustodial parent will often appear and seek a reduction in child support; that
parent is probably paying no support. Other noncustodial parents may, however, attempt to
take advantage of the section.
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A certain air of unreality attends all these machinations. In 1979,
the Department of Social Services acknowledged that it could not esti-
mate what amount of public funds, if any, would be saved under sec-
tion 5127.6.121 There is good reason to think that not much will be.
First, AFDC computations do take into account, without regard to
questions of legal responsibility, amounts actually contributed to a
stepchild's support. 24 The Department apparently concedes, as one
would expect, that such contributions are made in many stepparent
families.12 5 Moreover, the current version of section 5127.6 is probably
no more consistent with the controlling federal AFDC statutory test
than was section 5127.5. Although the enactment of section 5127.6 was
accompanied by a repeal of section 209, which had expressly precluded
stepparent support responsibilities, no section was enacted to impose
such responsibilities. Further, section 5127.6 itself imputes support
only as to the income of a stepparent with whom the child resides, ig-
noring the income of a noncustodial parent's spouse. Federal rules,
however, permit a state program to receive federal funds only if the
state predicates its reference to a stepparent's income upon a generally
applicable stepparent support obligation-that is, one that applies
whether or not AFDC monies are at issue.' 26 The section's attempted
omission of such computations when support from a noncustodial par-
ent is at issue, together with the "considered unconditionally available"
language, make clear that the section is for welfare purposes alone, and
not a statute of general applicability. It, like section 5127.5, brings con-
fusion but no benefit to the code.
A more straightforward treatment of the issue is possible. Tests
for child support do take into account the ability of a parent to earn,
even if that parent does not choose to seek employment or voluntarily
earns at a level below his or her capacity. 2 7 The situation would be
123. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, 1979-80 REGULAR SESSION,
ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL No. 381 (Boatwright), as amended in Senate on Aug. 21, 1979,
at I (Aug. 28, 1979) ("The intent of this provision is to make an individual's-income avail-
able to support his or her spouse's AFDC child, thereby reducing the AFDC grant payment.
The Department of Social Services indicates that it is unable to estimate the amount of
savings resulting from this provision.").
124. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a)(1) (1980).
125. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, 1979-80
REGULAR SES§ION, BILL DIGEST FOR A.B. 381, at 2 (Hearing Date: April 17, 1979) (con-
taining unattributed and unsubstantiated statement that "about three percent of the AFDC-
FG cases have stepfathers. About 36% of these stepfathers contribute to the support of the
AFDC-FG family.").
126. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a)(1) (1980).
127. See supra note 106 & accompanying text.
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greatly improved if sections 5127.5 and 5127.6 were repealed, section
209 (which frees stepparents of support obligations) were restored, and
section 199 (which limits a child to support enforcement against his or
her parent's earnings once that parent has remarried) were repealed.
The artificial partition of community property suggested by section
5127.5 would be avoided. Courts would continue to establish support
obligations according to parental ability, and the Department of Social
Services would be free to include in its computation the amount of such
a direct parental obligation or, if larger, the amount actually contrib-
uted by the parent and stepparent to the child's support. Finally, there
would be no further discrimination between the treatment of the house-
hold in which a child lives and that of its noncustodial parent, and no
danger that imputed but fictitious support payments might benefit a
noncustodial parent who seeks a reduced child support obligation.
Obligations to Each Other
Many of the issues that arise in assessing the parties' relative duties
to others reappear as one considers the appropriate management of
property in relation to the spouses' responsibilities to one another.
Here, too, substantive legal doctrines should dictate management rules,
but the current code lacks a comprehensive scheme that rationalizes
these aspects of marital property law.
Interspousal torts
In recognition of the uniquely personal responsibility of one
spouse for his or her tortious behavior that has injured the other, Civil
Code section 5113 directs that damages owed by the tortfeasor should
in all cases come initially from that spouse's separate property. 28 Sen-
sibly, however, the section also authorizes the use of insurance pro-
ceeds to recompense the wrong, even if the policy was purchased with
community property. 29 The initial order of satisfaction imposed by
the section resembles that provided under section 5122 for compensa-
tion to third parties for a tort committed by a spouse who was not act-
128. Civil Code § 5113(a) (West 1970) provides: "Where an injury to a married person
is caused in whole or in part by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of his spouse, the
community property may not be used to discharge the liability of the tortfeasor spouse to the
injured spouse or his liability to make contribution to any joint tortfeasor until the separate
property of the tortfeasor spouse, not exempt from execution, is exhausted." However, a
waiver of this rule is permitted. Id § 5113(b).
129. Id § 5113(c). For a recommendation that a similar provision be added to Califor-
nia Civil Code § 5122, which concerns tort liabilities to third parties, see supra note 63.
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ing for the benefit of the community. 30
What rule should apply once the tortfeasor's separate property is
exhausted, however, is less clear. One model distinguishes an injury
that occurs while the tortfeasor is acting for the benefit of the commu-
nity (as in driving the other spouse to a family gathering), and in such
cases permits payment of the residual damages from the community
property.' 31 The substantive policy decision that supports this ap-
proach is a conclusion that the community should be the guarantor of a
spouse's failings even in these cases and that it is as appropriate to
place secondary liability on the community here as it is in cases of in-
jury to third parties.132 Under this view the relative disadvantage to a
spouse who participates in the payment of his or her own damages is
offset by the fact that such damages become the victim's separate prop-
erty,133 an exception to the usual rule that makes personal injury recov-
eries community property. 34 Torts committed while the responsible
spouse is not acting for the benefit of the community receive different
treatment. Here, resort to the community property for satisfaction is
computed at a two-for-one rate to insure that the portion of the total
amount paid from community property which represents the one-half
ownership interest of the tortfeasor fully pays for the damages inflicted
by that spouse. 135 This model is based upon the current version of sec-
tion 5113 to the extent that it resorts initially to the tortfeasor's separate
property in all cases of interspousal torts.' 36
A somewhat different scheme simply incorporates interspousal
130. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5122 (West 1980), set forth supra at note 59.
131. The relative responsibility of the tortfeasor's quasi-community property should be
handled as is recommended supra at note 63.
132. For a discussion of community property liability for tortious injury to a third party,
see supra text accompanying notes 59-69.
133. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5126(c) (West Supp. 1982).
134. Id § 5126(a).
135. If, for example, a spouse received a damages award of $5,000, payment of $5,000
from the separate property of the other spouse to the victim's separate property would be
consistent with the primary liability imposed by § 5113. Should the victim instead accept
payment from the community property, a transfer of $10,000 to the victim's separate prop-
erty would be necessary to ensure that the tortfeasor's half interest in the transferred prop-
erty equalled the amount of the spouse's injuries-$5,000. The other one half of the $10,000
would represent the one-half ownership interest already held in that property by the injured
spouse.
Section 5126 should be amended to clarify that damages received for interspousal torts
are subject to the same duty to reimburse expenses incurred by reason of the injury as are
other personal injury recoveries. Although expenses paid by the tortfeasor out of his or her
separate property are undoubtedly recompensed by a set-off in the computation of damages,
the current right to reimbursement of expended community funds is not clear.
136. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5113(a) (West 1970), set forth supra at note 128.
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torts into the provisions of section 5122 that govern damage liability to
third parties.' 37 The orders of satisfaction then depend solely upon
whether the activity giving rise to the injury is undertaken for the bene-
fit of the community. The rule could be adapted to the special circum-
stances of interspousal injury by retaining the provision that makes a
damage recovery from a spouse the victim's separate property 38 and,
perhaps, by directing a two-for-one payment out of community prop-
erty if the tort is not committed in conjunction with community activi-
ties. A final approach retains section 5113, yet clarifies it only by
specifying whether recoveries out of community property are to be
made on a two-for-one basis, refusing to distinguish cases of commu-
nity benefit as between the spouses. Whichever model is adopted, the
existing provision in section 5113 that permits the injured spouse to
accept payment out of community property rather than existing sepa-
rate property sources should be retained but clarified to require a two-
for-one computation for such substituted recovery.
Interspousal property transactions
The standard of good faith in confidential relations 39 would seem
to require that contracts entered into between husbands and wives be
honored by them. This idea and the equally appealing one that hus-
bands and wives should be treated neither better nor worse than third
parties with contract claims pose special difficulties in implementation.
The following discussion first treats the issues that arise in interspousal
litigation, then touches briefly upon some of the implications for third
parties who deal with the spouses.
Rarely, of course, will spouses deal with each other at arm's
length, and rarely will their agreements be in writing. Accordingly,
should a contract dispute arise, proof will often turn upon statements as
to what was said or intended and evidence of actions taken. Precisely
because the likelihood of informal transactions between family mem-
bers is high, the benefit of presumptions or writing requirements that
might avoid such disputes is low. Absent factual or policy reasons to
presume that people do not in fact enter certain contracts, rules that
preclude proof of such agreements may empty courtrooms but not
serve any equitable purpose.
Indeed, it can be persuasively argued that courts exist precisely to
permit the determination of parties' disputes and that disagreements
137. See id. § 5122 (West Supp. 1982), set forth supra at note 59.
138. See id § 5126(c) (West Supp. 1982).
139. Civil Code § 5103, set forth supra at note 36, imposes this duty.
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between family members are as deserving of judicial time as are similar
claims between strangers. If one is concerned that married persons be
permitted to agree and disagree with each other to the same extent that
others are and that courts be permitted to grant relief where the facts
support it, one is led to the conclusion that artificial barriers to recov-
ery, whether by way of presumptions or of writing requirements, are
inequitable. Their imposition does not eliminate breached agreements,
only legal relief for such breaches, promoting disenchantment with the
legal process in those who have been injured. Judicial recognition that
such requirements operate most harshly to the disadvantage of the un-
sophisticated explains the long history of cases that avoid writing re-
quirements through doctrines such as execution, part performance, and
estoppel.t14
Presumptions that do not totally bar relief, however, have played a
significant role in shaping the current California law of interspousal
transactions. Based in part on conclusions as to how people in fact
behave and in part on policy considerations, many of these presump-
tions are in need of reform.
Theories of presumed gifts and automatic rights to reimbursement
grew through case law during the years when a husband had sole man-
agement and control of the community property. 41 Recognizing that
140. See, e.g., Woods v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 702, 299 P.2d 657,
659-60 (1956) (" 'The object of the oral agreement of transmutation was fully performed
when the agreement was made for it immediately transmuted and converted the separate
property of each spouse into community property, and nothing further remained to be
done. '. . . Recognizing the practice of informality in property dealings between husband
and wife it appears there was nothing more to be done in this case. . . .It is not surprising
under the facts in the instant case that nothing more was done. . . .") (quoting In re Estate
of Raphael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 931, 939, 206 P.2d 391, 395 (Ist Dist. 1949)); Estate of Sheldon,
75 Cal. App. 3d 364, 142 Cal. Rptr. 119 (5th Dist. 1977) (estoppel). These cases avoided the
writing and recordation requirements of Civil Code §§ 5133, 5134 (West 1970) that apply to
antenuptial agreements. The rule is codified in Civil Code § 1698(b), (d) (West Supp. 1982):
"(b) A contract in writing may be modified by an oral agreement to the extent that the oral
agreement is executed by the parties.
"(d) Nothing in this section precludes in an appropriate case the application of rules
of law concerning estoppel, oral novation and substitution of a new agreement, rescission of
a written contract by an oral agreement, waiver of a provision of a written contract, or oral
independent collateral contracts."
Concern for the injustice that might result from the imposition of a writing requirement
as to property agreements between nonmarital cohabitants recently prompted the defeat of a
proposal to extend the Statute of Frauds to this area. Bruch, Nonmarital Cohabitation in the
Common Law Countries: .4 Study in Judicial-Legislative Interaction, 29 AMER. J. COMP. L.
217, 228 n.46 (1981) (discussing Cal. A.B. 564 (Ingalls), California Legislature, 1979-80 Reg-
ular Session).
141. See Prager, supra note 30, at 43-44, 77-78.
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something unusual had happened if the husband chose to place prop-
erty in the name of his wife and beyond his own management reach,
the courts concluded that a gift could fairly be presumed. 42 At the
same time, fear that a husband might use his community management
powers to enrich his separate property led the courts to imply an auto-
matic right of reimbursement to the community when its funds had
been applied to the husband's separate property. 43 Thus the rule be-
came "gift unless agreement to the contrary" when community prop-
erty was placed in the wife's name, and "reimbursement unless
agreement to the contrary" when community property was used to in-
crease or maintain the husband's separate property estate. This gift
presumption was partially codified in Civil Code section 5110,44 which
provides that an acquisition made in the name of a married woman
prior to the date of equal management and control is presumptively her
separate property. Most other acquisitions by married people are pre-
sumptively community property under the section.145
No statute has clarified the effect of equal management and con-
trol on these presumptions of gift and reimbursement. The statutory
restriction of the special separate property presumption to a wife's ac-
quisitionsprior to the era of equal management and control arguably
evidences legislative intent to do away with the gift presumption for
later acquisitions. The matter is, however, by no means clear. Al-
142. See, e.g., Taylor v. Opperman, 79 Cal. 468, 21 P. 869 (1889); Johnson v. Johnson,
214 Cal. App. 2d 29, 29 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1st Dist. 1963); Estate of Horn, 102 Cal. App. 2d 635,
228 P.2d 99 (2d Dist. 1951).
143. See, e.g., Dunn v. Mullan, 211 Cal. 583, 296 P. 604 (193 1); In re Marriage of War-
ren, 28 Cal. App. 3d 777, 104 Cal. Rptr. 860 (2d Dist. 1972); Provost v. Provost, 102 Cal.
App. 755, 283 P. 842 (2d Dist. 1929).
144. Civil Code § 5110 (West Supp. 1982) provides: "Except as provided in Sections
5107, 5108, and 5109, all real property situated in this state and all personal property wher-
ever situated acquired during the marriage by a married person while domiciled in this state,
and property held in trust pursuant to Section 5113.5, is community property; but whenever
any real or personal property, or any interest therein or encumbrance thereon, is acquired
prior to January 1, 1975, by a married woman by an instrument in writing, the presumption
is that the same is her separate property, and if so acquired by such married woman and any
other person the presumption is that she takes the part acquired by her, as tenant in com-
mon, unless a different intention is expressed in the instrument; except, that when any of
such property is acquired by husband and wife by an instrument in which they are described
as husband and wife, unless a different intention is expressed in the instrument, the pre-
sumption is that such property is the community property of the husband and wife .... "
145. Id Joint tenancy title, however, is treated as establishing a "different intention,"
one that the parties hold equal separate property interests. Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767,
7 P.2d 1003 (1932). A special provision in § 5110 reestablishes the community property
presumption at dissolution or legal separation for a couple's joint tenancy single family resi-
dence, however, if it was acquired during marriage. See infra note 153.
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though a spouse's purchase of property in his or her own name under a
regime of equal management and control should, of course, raise a
community property presumption, what should the result be when one
spouse purchases property and places title in the other spouse's name?
Under the reasoning of the older cases, if a spouse having management
and control voluntarily places the property beyond his or her manage-
ment reach, the act should raise a presumption of gift. The view was
followed without question in the recent case of In re Marriage of Lu-
cas,146 where community property was used in partial payment for a
camper, title to which was taken in the wife's name.' 47 It is, however,
of dubious continuing utility. Under a regime of equal management
and control, considerations of convenience, happenstance, or concerns
for insurance, taxation, or probate may be more likely to dictate which
spouse purchases or takes title to a given item or makes payments on a
continuing obligation than is an independent decision as to ownership.
Even (or perhaps especially) in those families in which monetary deci-
sions are made by one person alone, the other spouse may implement
those decisions by paying the bills. Now that courts have been freed to
look to actual intent in transactions between members of nonmarital
unions, subject only to a presumption of intended fair dealing, 148 it
seems high time to extend the rule to married couples.
The "no presumptions" rule could be expected to have major con-
sequences in a second area, where separate property of one or both of
the spouses has been used together with community property in the
purchase of an item. This most frequently occurs in two situations:
when an acquisition is made over a long period of time beginning
before the marriage, with payment coming first from separate, then
from community, income1 49 and when a purchase requires a substantial
down payment which is made from separate property sources, with the
balance paid from community property earnings. 50 In the case of life
146. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
147. One wonders whether the California Supreme Court would have been prompted to
take a closer look at this area if the van had been taken in the name of the husband; the old
gift cases would not have looked so similar.
148. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 682 & n.22, 557 P.2d 106, 121 & n.22, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 830 & n.22 (1976).
149. See, e.g., Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. 222, 251 P. 640 (2d Dist. 1926).
150. The facts in In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr.
855 (1980), which also involved a dispute over a house, were typical. During a 12-year
marriage, the wife used her separate property assets to provide a down payment for the
family residence, with the couple taking a loan for the balance. Title was taken in joint
tenancy. The wife used more separate property to make improvements on the house, but the
loan payments came from community property earnings. See infra note 153.
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insurance and pensions, the theory that an acquisition occurs over time
has replaced the traditional theory that the character of an initial pay-
ment establishes ownership, and the cases have therefore apportioned
ownership interests according to the relative contributions of separate
and community wealth.15 1 A related rule seems necessary for other
types of purchases. It no longer makes sense to presume that a separate
property down payment on a home, title to which is taken in joint own-
ership with a spouse, is contributed as a gift by the separate property's
owner. Although the rule has the benign purpose of favoring the com-
munity, it appears harsh in an era of frequent divorce and increasingly
short marriages. Common experience indicates that home purchases,
especially in recent years, require the mustering of assets in a way that
most other purchases do not. For many, if not most, couples, such
purchases are undertaken relatively early in marriage, when the likeli-
hood of a significant pool of community property is small. Instead, an
inheritance, prenuptial earnings, or property from a prior marriage is
used in conjunction with community property. 52 Although the parties
may not discuss their understanding, there can be little doubt but that,
if asked at the time, a spouse who contributes separate property would
indicate that he or she expects to have it returned if the marriage
should founder. Yet the most recent California Supreme Court opin-
ion on point forces a forfeiture of that spouse's separate property inter-
est unless the spouses agree that the separate property interest will be
preserved.' 53 After a marriage of twenty or thirty years, the rule seems
151. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9
(1978) (retirement/disability pay); In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561,
126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976) (nonvested pension); Biltoft v. Wootten, 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 157
Cal. Rptr. 581 (4th Dist. 1979) (group life insurance); Modem Woodmen of America v.
Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 P. 754 (1st Dist. 1931) (life insurance).
152. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 855
(1980) (trust proceeds of wife); In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 79 (1975) (wife's premarital earnings from law practice); In re Marriage of Aufmuth,
89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1st Dist. 1979) (savings account held in trust for
wife by her parents); In re Marriage of Smith, 79 Cal. App. 3d 725, 145 Cal. Rptr. 205 (4th
Dist. 1978) (wife's inheritance from uncle); In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244,
105 Cal. Rptr. 483 (lst Dist. 1973) (house acquired by husband during a previous marriage).
These cases are properly distinguished from those in which separate property is placed in
joint ownership, but no commingling occurs. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cademartori, 119
Cal. App. 3d 970, 174 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1st Dist. 1981).
153. See In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 815, 614 P.2d 285, 289, 166 Cal. Rptr.
853, 857 (1980). The court held that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the
special community property presumption of Civil Code § 5110 for a single family residence
acquired during marriage in joint tenancy title would prevail: "In the present case, there is
no evidence of an agreement or understanding that [the wife] was to retain a separate prop-
erty interest in the house. . . . The only findings in this regard are that neither party in-
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fair enough. After a marriage of two years or seven, however, the re-
sult can be harsh.
A previously published, related study proposes a number of
changes in the treatment of forms of title, mixed investments, and the
rules of property division at divorce that would contribute to a more
realistic solution to such problems. 154 Whether or not those recommen-
dations are adopted, gift presumptions should be expressly removed
from the law by statute. This change would objectify a court's inquiry
and permit separate property investments to be returned without pen-
alty. To prevent overly favoring the separate property interest, a sup-
plemental rule is proposed: that only reimbursement (to the degree
possible without impinging upon community interests) be granted,
rather than a proportionate ownership interest, if separate property
funds were traced into a mixed asset other than insurance, pensions, or
the like.155 This would strike a compromise: traceable separate prop-
erty interests would not be subject to forfeiture, yet they would receive
reimbursement rather than an ownership interest; maximum accretions
would be reserved for the community, with separate property serving as
the guarantor of the community interest. 156
This rule should be distinguished from that which should apply if
funds are commingled, for example, in a bank account, with numerous
deposits and withdrawals. If tracing of the separate property could not
be persuasively shown, commingling should be held to result in a trans-
tended a gift to the other. Such evidence and findings are insufficient to rebut the
presumption [at dissolution or legal separation of community property] arising from [the
title rule] set forth in Civil Code section 5110." Since the trial court had not made a finding
as to whether there had been such an agreement, the case was reversed and remanded. Id
at 815-16, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58. See supra note 150.
154. See Bruch, Definion and Division, supra note 39,passim.
155. In the case of contributions to a retirement or pension fund, or the payment of
premiums on life insurance from current income, the mixing of assets occurs because pay-
ments are made over time, with the source of each contribution or payment depending upon
the marital status of the employee or policy holder at the time. Whether the contributions
are made by the employee or by the employer is irrelevant; employer contributions are seen
as a form of compensation and are therefore classified as separate or community property in
the same manner as the employee's wages would be. Because the amounts attributable to
different time periods are clear, there is no tracing difficulty. Nor is there much likelihood
that a transmutation in ownership will occur. Finally, there seems no reason to penalize a
spouse for the forced mixing of his or her assets that occurs. Accordingly, proportionate
ownership interests are fair.
156. Of course, where only small amounts of community property are commingled in
comparison to the amount of separate property funds, a de minimis rule would apply to
affirm the separate property ownership interest. See Estate of Cudworth, 133 Cal. 462, 65 P.
1041 (1901).
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mutation of the whole to community property.15 7 In this case, conven-
ience alone rather than a genuine familial purpose would have been
served by the act of commingling, and the separate property owner
might fairly be held to have commingled at his or her own peril. 158
The current rule that presumes reimbursement when a spouse ap-
plies community property to that spouse's separate property, or uses
community property to preserve or maintain such property,1 59 seems
sound to the extent that it protects the community from unilateral re-
movals. It might be improved upon, however, by codifying the rule
that gives the community the maximum recovery, either reimburse-
ment or pro rata ownership, in any separate property that was bene-
fited. 160 Once again, the community interest should be given the
157. Whether interest should be given to the separate property share if the property's
value would permit such compensation after the community property and interest to that
fund have been deducted depends on the ultimate characterization of earnings on separate
property. A related study by the author recommends that such earnings be deemed commu-
nity, not separate, property. See Bruch, Defnition and Division, supra note 39, at 795-99.
Windfalls should go to the community in any event.
158. This rule is consistent with the rationale used by the California Supreme Court in
See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 784, 415 P.2d 776, 780, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (1966): "The
husband may protect his separate property by not commingling community and separate
assets and income. Once he commingles, he assumes the burden of keeping records ade-
quate to establish the balance of community income and expenditures at the time an asset is
acquired with community property." In See, the husband kept one account into which he
usually deposited his community property earnings, although on occasion he would deposit
them into an account otherwise composed of separate property assets. He also transferred
separate assets into the community account when necessary to preserve his credit balance.
His actions were clearly prompted by considerations of convenience rather than any familial
purpose. When he was unable to establish which funds were spent and which remained in
the account, the court held that the presumption of community property would prevail. The
precise burden of proof, however, has never been well articulated. Compare Estate of Mur-
phy, 15 Cal. 3d 907, 544 P.2d 956, 126 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1976), with In re Marriage of Mix, 14
Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975). Wisconsin's proposed marital property
system would track the commingling rule of See: "If commingling separate and marital
property occurs in a manner which makes tracing the separate property unreasonably diffi-
cult. . . the commingled property is presumed to be marital property." 1981 Wis. Assembly
Bill 370, Senate Substitute Amendment 1, § 766.33(l)(c).
Codification of the See commingling rule is recommended, with specific reference to
the burden of proof. See generally Freese v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan So'y, 139 Cal. 392, 73 P.
172 (1903) (discussing the language of the cases). It should not, however, be permitted to
preclude the application of a de minimis test for "reverse" commingling; the commingled
mass should be held to be separate property if only insignificant amounts of community
property have been included in it. See, e.g., Estate of Cudworth, 133 Cal. 462, 65 P. 1041
(1901); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2341 (West Supp. 1982).
159. See, e.g., Estate of Turner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 576, 96 P.2d 363 (2d Dist. 1939).
160. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Warren, 28 Cal. App. 3d 777, 104 Cal. Rptr. 860 (2d
Dist. 1972).
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greater protection, without causing a forfeiture of the separate
property.
To the degree possible, courts that deal with third party claims
against the couple's assets should respect these doctrines that control
ownership as between the spouses. Although there is understandable
concern that couples will be tempted to falsify agreements in order to
defeat creditor access, current law contains several protections to
counter this danger. Most importantly, the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act 61 permits a creditor to avoid transfers, 62 not only if they
were made with fraudulent intent,163 but also if they were made for less
than a fair consideration' 64 and either resulted in the transferor's insol-
vency or were made once the transferor was already insolvent. 65 Civil
Code section 3440 goes further, however, providing a conclusive pre-
sumption that a conveyance of personal property is fraudulent as to
creditors if it is not "accompanied by an immediate delivery followed
by an actual and continued change of possession of the things trans-
ferred."' 66 This overbroad presumption permits creditors to avoid al-
most all interspousal transfers of personal property, since cohabiting
couples will almost always be held to share possession of their personal
property.167
The Lucas case, which involved gift presumptions and the effects
of title, highlights the problem. Mr. Lucas' purchase of a car in his
wife's name, using a community property vehicle as a trade-in, was
• held to raise a presumption of gift to Mrs. Lucas. 68 Accordingly, ab-
sent proof of an agreement to the contrary, the new car was entirely
Mrs. Lucas' separate property. Section 3440, however, gives a creditor
161. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3439-3439.13 (West 1970).
162. Id § 3439.09.
163. Id § 3439.07.
164. Fair consideration is defined in § 3439.03 and the definition is incorporated into the
definition of fraudulent conveyances that is set forth in §§ 3439.04 through 3439.06. Id.
§§ 3439.03-3439.06.
165. Id §§ 3439.04 (conveyance "by person who is or will be thereby rendered insol-
vent"), 3439.05 (transfer made by person engaged in business or about to begin in business
when, subsequent to the transfer, the business capital is unreasonably small; intent is irrele-
vant), 3439.06 (as to both present and future creditors, conveyances made without fair con-
sideration when the person making the transfer intends or believes that he will incur debts
beyond his ability to pay). Transfers made for a fair consideration are not fraudulent under
these sections. Id
166. Id § 3440 (exceptions provided for choses in action, property exempt from execu-
tion, and sundry transactions of limited importance to the domestic setting).
167. See cases cited infra note 169.
168. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
See supra notes 146-48 & accompanying text.
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of the community the absolute right to treat such a gift as partially
community property, even if the couple produces documentation that
the community was fairly compensated for the trade-in. Although a
sham may legitimately be inferred in most cases in which a change of
possession does not occur, section 3440 does not reflect reality in the
domestic context. In the reported cases dealing with family members,
inequitable results to third parties could readily have been avoided
under the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act that
test transactions by insolvency or fraudulent intent.169 Section 3440 is
overly broad and should be amended to exclude transfers that take
place within a household.
Similarly, a blanket requirement that transactions be concluded in
writing would be no more likely to promote equitable results in this
context than it would in litigation between the spouses. 70 Community
creditors already benefit from Civil Code section 5110's presumption of
community ownership for acquisitions during marriage,' 71 and the
pool of property available to them will be enlarged further if changes in
the definition of community property proposed in the initial portion of
this project are adopted. 172 Most importantly, however, a special Stat-
ute of Frauds for married couples would discriminate against marriage,
contrary to the policies of encouraging marriage and protecting the
family unit. 173
Interspousal support obligations
Although Civil Code section 5100 imposes mutual support obliga-
tions on spouses, 174 the obligation during marriage is more limited than
that accorded either the couple's children or a prior spouse. While the
support rights of these other classes of claimants may be predicated
upon both community and separate property sources, with the court
169. See, e.g., Murphy v. Mulgrew, 102 Cal. 547, 36 P. 857 (1894) (wife purchased hor-
ses from husband, but the horses remained where they were and husband continued to man-
age them); Pfunder v. Goodwin, 83 Cal. App. 551, 257 P. 119 (2d Dist. 1927) ($500 tractor
sold by husband to wife for $10 and husband continued to use it); Blaney v. Cline, 53 Cal.
App. 686, 200 P. 751 (2d Dist. 1921) (husband delivered a bill of sale to wife one month after
selling her his car, but nonetheless continued to use the car for his business).
170. See supra notes 139-40 & accompanying text.
171. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1982), set forth supra at notes 139-40.
172. See Bruch, Definition and Division, supra note 39, at 795-839.
173. See supra note 140. Professor Reppy has made this point respecting recordation
requirements. W. Reppy, Comments on Memorandum 80-23-Liability of Marital Property
4 (April 9, 1980) (memorandum to the California Law Revision Commission staff) (copy on
file with the author). The reasoning applies equally to writing requirements.
174. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5100 (West 1970), supra note 75.
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apportioning responsibility between the sources as is just, 75 the obliga-
tion to support a current spouse does not extend to separate property
unless the community property and quasi-community property have
been exhausted. This rule, codified in Civil Code section 5121, which
details creditor access to the separate property of the supporting spouse
for necessaries, 176 and section 5132, which specifies the support obliga-
tion as between spouses, 177 should be revised.
Clearly a family with a community property income of $25,000 per
year will not maintain the same standard of living as a family which
has community property income of $25,000 per year and separate prop-
erty trust income of $150,000 per year. To the extent that support obli-
gations in these wealthier marriages are imputed solely or initially to
the community property, the elevated living standard that reflects total
familial wealth will impoverish the community. 178 A far better rule
would recognize that a couple's living standard is fully as reflective of
all sources of familial wealth as are the living standards of children and
former spouses. 179
The situation is no different if the couple should separate infor-
mally. Absent an agreement or court action, the parties have no reason
to expect that their financial rights have been altered. Indeed, as with
postseparation earnings, experience indicates that spouses think that
their legal rights remain constant until they have affirmatively indi-
175. See supra notes 102, 111 & accompanying text.
176. Civil Code § 5121 (West Supp. 1982) provides: "The separate property of a spouse
is liable for the debts of the spouse contracted before or after the marriage of the spouse, but
is not liable for the debts of the other spouse contracted after marriage; provided, that the
separate property of the spouse is liable for the payment of debts contracted by either spouse
for the necessaries of life pursuant to Section 5132."
177. Id § 5132 states that "[a] spouse must support the other spouse while they are liv-
ing together out of the separate property of the spouse when there is no community property
or quasi-community property."
178. Bodenheimer, The Community Without Community Property. The Needfor Legisla-
tive Attention to Separate-Property Marriages Under Community Property Laws, 8 CAL. W.L.
REV. 381 (1972); see, e.g., Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 137 (1971).
179. For example, if an independently wealthy spouse never pursued outside employ-
ment, but was occupied instead with management of that separate property, it should be
possible to impute a reasonable community property income to that spouse's activity without
vitiating it with the hypothetical payment of living expenses that were predicated upon the
separate property wealth. These issues could be largely mooted if separate property income
were also characterized as community property, a recommendation of the initial portion of
this study. See Bruch, Definition and Division, supra note 39, at 795-99. In any event, it is
appropriate to apportion the responsibility for support among all sources of a family's
wealth, no matter how the funding sources are characterized. See supra notes 102, 111 &
accompanying text.
November 1982]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
cated that they wish a change.180 Thus, there is no reason for a sepa-
rated spouse to curtail normal expenses until he or she receives notice
that the couple's finances have become strained by the separation. To
the contrary, it is likely that usual expenditures will be maintained.
The law should recognize this reasonable expectation of the parties.
Any other rule forces formal action to secure support rights, which
would be awarded in any event in light of the parties' standard of liv-
ing.18 Along with the litigation, it can be anticipated that further mari-
tal discord would be produced, enhancing rather than minimizing the
chances of an ultimate breakdown of the marriage.
The Law Revision Commission has already made a preliminary
decision that support rights should not be prejudiced by the fact of sep-
aration alone, indicated by its tentative recommendation to amend
Civil Code section 5131, which currently bars support rights after sepa-
ration unless they have been set by the separation agreement. 8 2 Some-
what inconsistently, however, the Commission also plans to
recommend restricting the support duty owed, at least as to creditors, to
support for "common necessaries."'' 8 3 This curtailment of the spouses'
customary living habits without notice would be unfortunate. It would
operate to the detriment of innocent third parties who have continued
to provide services during separation, having neither knowledge of the
financial aspects of the separation nor reason to believe that the parties
could no longer afford their services. These creditors will have con-
tracted with the spouse requiring support, who also has no reason to
assume that expenditures must be lowered. 184 Because a right against
an obligor's separate property does not exist under current law unless
all other sources of funds have been exhausted, 185 the proposed revi-
sion is most likely to affect true separate property marriages, which typ-
ically involve considerable wealth.186 The problem does not arise as in
180. See supra notes 92-94 & accompanying text.
181. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 480 1(a)(8) (West Supp. 1982).
182. The Commission would bar support only if it were expressly waived in a written
separation agreement. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 71, at 24, 35
(proposed §§ 5120.040(a)(2), 5131).
183. Id at 24 (proposed § 5120.040).
184. Why a Mrs. Rockefeller or a Mrs. Ford should be expected to fire the household
help and take up cleaning the floors upon separation, when their husbands would hardly be
expected to take on such duties in their own households, is unclear. Equally puzzling are
Professor Reppy's suggestions that this result somehow follows from the tenets of women's
liberation or that rules controlling court-ordered support are relevant to creditor access if no
such order has been entered. See Reppy, supra note 60, at 186.
185. See supra notes 176-77.
186. See, e.g., Wisnom v. McCarthy, 48 Cal. App. 697, 192 P. 337 (Ist Dist. 1920).
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exemption cases, where there are insufficient funds to meet the credi-
tor's claim and the term "common necessaries" was developed. s7
The support cases do not often occur and can be expected even less
frequently if Civil Code section 5118 is revised so that earnings during
separation are community property 88 and thus available to such credi-
tors. Even if earnings are community property, however, there will be
no reason to apply a more stringent standard than "necessaries" for
access to the separate property of the noncontracting spouse. This test
automatically restricts recovery to amounts appropriate to the parties'
financial situation. 8 9 No greater burden should be placed in the path
of the couple's creditors on these facts.
More serious problems exist when debts for new and inappropriate
purposes are incurred during separation. Here, rather than disadvan-
tage creditors, the preferable course appears to be to impose orders of
satisfaction for creditor claims, as suggested above, 190 and to provide a
series of remedies as described in the following sections on sole man-
agement, 191 separation of the community, 192 recapture, 193 and reim-
bursement.' 94 Spouses should be entitled to recover for violations of
the good faith management standard and should be able to restrict one
spouse's ability to further endanger the financial well-being of the
other. Absent formal interspousal action, however, the couple's credi-
tors should remain entitled to the normal range of remedies, and mar-
shalling on behalf of the debtor should be available to allocate
responsibility according to the nature of the transaction and the rele-
vant sources of familial wealth.' 95
Sole Management
In a number of situations, sound management requires sole rather
187. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 723.051 (West 1980). Exemption cases involve a
judgment debtor's retention of earnings necessary for support. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Pallesi, 73 Cal. App. 3d 424, 140 Cal. Rptr. 842 (5th Dist. 1977).
188. See supra notes 92-94 & accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 488, 516 P.2d 289, 297, 110
Cal. Rptr. 897, 905 (1973); Sanker v. Humborg, 48 Cal. App. 2d 205, 119 P.2d 433 (4th Dist.
1941); Wisnom v. McCarthy, 48 CaL App. 697, 192 P. 337 (1st Dist. 1920).
190. See supra notes 59-69 (third-party tort creditors), 71-76 (prenuptial creditors), 77-
101 (contract creditors), 102-111 (support creditors), 128-38 (interspousal tort creditors), 174-
79 (interspousal support creditors) & accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 196-212 & accompanying text.
192. See infra notes 213-19 & accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 232-42 & accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 243-48 & accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 228-31 & accompanying text.
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than joint management and control. California's statutes provide for
sole management in three ways. First, sole management is expressly
authorized for community property businesses or if one spouse has a
conservator. Civil Code section 5125(d) makes the operation of a com-
munity property business subject to the sole management of the entre-
preneur to assure the smooth functioning of the concern, on the
assumption that joint decisionmaking is potentially divisive in a way
that would be destructive of the community's ultimate interest in the
business' success, while Civil Code section 5128 and provisions in the
Probate Code that took effect on January 1, 1980, give sole manage-
ment to a married person whose spouse has a conservator, subject to
the continuing ability of the spouse lacking capacity to make reason-
able provisions for the family's necessaries. 96 Second, statutes that
restrict financial institutions to dealings with named account holders
functionally permit one spouse to exclude the other from control over
funds by placing them in an individual account. 97 Finally, the rule
that compensation from one spouse for the other spouse's personal in-
juries becomes the separate property of the injured spouse rather than
community property, as would otherwise be the case,' 98 removes the
recovery from the management reach of the tortfeasor. 99
In contrast, there is no longer a provision authorizing exclusive
management and control of community property personal injury dam-
ages received from third parties for causes of action arising during the
marriage. 200 However, should the couple later divorce, such recoveries
are subject to a special rule of division if they have not been commin-
gled with other forms of community property. In such cases, the tort
victim receives the entire amount unless the interests of justice mandate
giving up to one-half the award to the other spouse.20 1 While the rea-
196. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5128 (West Supp. 1982); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1871, 3012(c)(1)-
(3) (West 1981) (whether or not lacking legal capacity, the spouse also retains the right to
make a will and to control wages and an allowance). A conservator for a spouse's property
may be appointed when a party "is substantially unable to manage his or her own financial
resources or resist fraud or undue influence .... Substantial inability [in this context] may
not be proved solely by isolated incidents of negligence or improvidence." Id § 1801(b).
197. See supra note 12 & accompanying text.
198. For a discussion of the possible need for a set-off or restitution to the community
for expenses incurred, see supra note 135.
199. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5126(a), (c) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill 370,
Senate Substitute Amendment 1, § 766.31(l)(e), (2)(d) (classifying damages received for
pain and suffering as the separate property of the injured spouse in all cases).
200. When California adopted the rule of equal management and control, the injured
spouse's exclusive management and control of damages received from a third party was
abolished. 1973 Cal. Stat. ch. 987, § 13.
201. California Civil Code § 4800(c) (West Supp. 1982) provides: "Notwithstanding the
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sons for this special rule of division are clearly sound, the requirement
that the funds remain uncommingled is troublesome, especially since
the injured spouse does not have exclusive management and control of
the award. A sounder rule would ask whether the funds could be iden-
tified under normal tracing rules. Further, reformers may wish to con-
sider whether sole management and control as to such damages should
be reinstated, either as a complement to this scheme or on its own
merits.
Dispensing with consent requirements
A number of states, California included, have developed standards
for judicial relief from joinder requirements in some cases. For exam-
ple, California's new Probate Code provisions, which assign sole man-
agement to one spouse when the other has a conservator, authorize the
conservator to approve transactions that would otherwise require the
consent of both spouses.202 They also allow judicial approval of trans-
actions if a spouse without legal capacity to consent does not have a
conservator.203 Legal incapacity for these purposes exists "if the spouse
is substantially unable to manage or control the community property,"
provisions of subdivision (a), community property personal injury damages shall be as-
signed to the party who suffered the injuries unless the court, after taking into account the
economic condition and needs of each party, the time that has elapsed since the recovery of
the damages or the accrual of the cause of action, and all other facts of the case, determines
that the interests of justice require another disposition. In such case, the community prop-
erty personal injury damages shall be assigned to the respective parties in such proportions
as the court determines to be just, except that at least one-half of such damages shall be
assigned to the party who suffered the injuries. As used in this subdivision, "community
property personal injury damages" means all money or other property received or to be
received by a person in satisfaction of a judgment for damages for his or her personal inju-.
ries or pursuant to an agreement for the settlement or compromise of a claim for such dam-
ages, if the cause of action for such damages arose during the marriage but is not separate
property as defined in Section 5126, unless such money or other property has been commin-
gled with other community property." Cf. 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill 370, Senate Substitute
Amendment 1, § 767.255(l Im), which authorizes the divorce court to consider: "Whether
any award of damages for personal injury included an award for loss of future income. If
so, the court may divide this award into marital and separate property according to that
portion of the award that applies as an income substitute during the time the person is
married and that portion of the award that applies as an income substitute during the time
the person is not married." Note that the draft also provides that recovery for pain and
suffering is the separate property of the victim in all cases. See supra note 199.
202. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 3071-3073 (West 1981).
203. Id §§ 3100-3154. The procedure is also available as to transactions for which the
Civil Code does not require the consent of both spouses and to declare that a spouse does
have the necessary legal capacity to consent to the transaction in question. California Pro-
bate Code § 3113 (West 1981) makes clear that no conservator need be appointed to bring a
proceeding under these sections, which deal with consent to particular transactions.
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"has a conservator," or otherwise fails to meet the standards imposed
by "principles of law otherwise applicable to the particular
transaction. ''204
Other states substitute judicial approval of specific transactions for
spousal consent under less extreme circumstances. Louisiana, for ex-
ample, permits one spouse to act unilaterally if the proposed transac-
tion is in the best interest of the family, and consent has been
arbitrarily refused or cannot be obtained due to physical or mental in-
capacity, commitment, imprisonment, or other absence of the noncon-
senting spouse.20 5 Similar authority is provided by New Mexico
statutes that deal with a spouse who has disappeared or is a prisoner of
war2°6 and by a Texas statute that deals with a spouse's incapacity,
desertion, disappearance, or the parties' permanent separation. 20 7
Such remedies should be made available in California. Of the ex-
isting models, one based on the Louisiana version seems most appro-
priate. It provides a two-part test, looking both to the family's best
interest and to the improper refusal to consent or the impossibility of
obtaining such consent.20 8
Action for sole management and control
The proposed Wisconsin statute provides for ongoing sole man-
agement in a further case: when a court decrees such sole management
after finding that it would be in the best interests of the couple because
one spouse has been "substantially injured or is likely to be substan-
tially injured by the other spouse's gross mismanagement, waste or ab-
204. Id § 3012(b)(1)-(3).
205. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2355 (West Supp. 1982). Some of the Louisiana language
appears in a Wisconsin provision that would also authorize sole management when there
has been substantial injury due to a spouse's long-term financial irresponsibility. See infra
note 209 & accompanying text.
206. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3-5, 40-3-16 (1978).
207. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.25 (Vernon 1975). The section applies as well to
an action to substitute one spouse's sole management and control for that which Texas law
would ordinarily give to the other. Because each spouse normally has sole management of
his or her own earnings, such relief provides one spouse with sole control over all but those
commingled funds that require joint management under Texas law. See id § 5.22.
208. To the extent, however, that imprisonment is listed as an independent ground for
dispensing with consent, the Louisiana model appears unsound. When consent can be ob-
tained from one who is imprisoned, it should be required unless an independent ground
under the statute, such as arbitrary refusal, exists. If consent is in fact unavailable because
the imprisonment is, for example, as a prisoner of war, absence and the impossibility of
obtaining consent independently provide relief under the Louisiana codes. See LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 2355 (West Supp. 1982).
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sence." 209 The court may, but need not, appoint an independent
guardian to protect the irresponsible spouse's interests.210 If one spouse
has evidenced serious financial irresponsibility over an extended pe-
riod, current California law provides no protection for the other spouse
unless there is a divorce and the parties' finances are permanently sev-
ered. To permit married couples to obtain the financial advantages of
unmarrieds without forcing a divorce, California needs some means of
separating their financial obligations or of protecting the more respon-
sible spouse from the financial recklessness of the other. If each spouse
has an independent earning capacity, it would seem preferable to allow
them to operate as independent financial entities, except for their mu-
tual support obligation. If instead there is one, or one primary, wage-
earner, the financial stability of the parties could be protected without
forcing a divorce by permitting the prudent spouse to ask the court to
authorize sole management of the couple's community property.21'
Such authorization should require that steps ordinarily requiring join-
der of the spouses be undertaken only with the consent of a court or of
an independent guardian, to provide the protection of joint
decisionmaking. 212
Petition for a Separate Property Marriage
As just noted, when continuing the marriage under normal man-
agement and liability rules would leave one spouse vulnerable to the
other spouse's continuing financial irresponsibility, relief should be
available without forcing a dissolution of the marriage. Optimally the
solution would also give the financially careless spouse considerable
freedom, lest that spouse in turn be induced to seek divorce and an
independent financial life. When both spouses have earnings or in-
dependent income, therefore, the best solution may be to permit a
spouse to petition for a separate property marriage rather than for sole
management and control of both parties' earnings.
Under the Wisconsin proposal, this relief would be available to
separated spouses, 213 but sole management and a division of previously
209. 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill 370, Senate Substitute Amendment 1, § 766.53.
210. Id
211. Of course, such a procedure could include provisions for recording the judgment or
for giving notice to creditors in some other fashion.
212. Should an action for sole management be accompanied by a partition of the com-
munity's assets, creditors from the period prior to the decree of sole management and con-
trol should be protected in the same fashion as they would be were the parties being
divorced. See infra notes 217-19 & accompanying text.
213. 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill 370, Senate Substitute Amendment 1, § 766.93(7); ef id
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acquired assets would remain the only remedies during cohabitation. 214
There seems no reason to restrict the spouse's or the court's options in
this fashion. Instead, permitting unilateral termination of the commu-
nity, both past and future, upon stated grounds and with court ap-
proval could prevent hardship while preserving marriages that the
parties wish to continue despite financial disagreements. Louisiana
permits such relief when the petitioner's interest in community prop-
erty is threatened "by the fraud, fault, neglect, or incompetence of the
other spouse, or by the disorder of [that spouse's] affairs. t215
Enactment of similar relief, predicated upon a finding of
threatened or actual substantial injury due to a spouse's financial irre-
sponsibility, is recommended. It will deter divorce in a small but real
number of cases and will expand the possibilities for varying relation-
ships within the traditional structure of marriage. Once separation of
property has been ordered, the result will be the same as if the spouses
had privately agreed to a separate property marriage: each spouse may
deal in the future as carefully or recklessly with his or her own assets as
desired; the other spouse will be neither hindered nor prejudiced
thereby, except to the extent that the spouse remains liable out of sepa-
rate property for support and necessaries. 216
Partition of Community Property and Debt
In conjunction with a suit for sole management or a separate prop-
erty marriage, the court should be authorized, upon request, to parti-
tion the couple's existing community property and divide their debts.21 7
Consistent with the policy of permitting property relief similar to that
which would be afforded at divorce, the standards and consequences of
the division should be those provided by Civil Code section 4800,
which governs property divisions in other judicial terminations of the
community. 218
§ 766.93(3)-(4), authorizing actions for partition and sole management, where no special
provisions for after-acquired property are made.
214. See id § 766.53.
215. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2374 (West Supp. 1982).
216. These obligations exist without regard to the couple's property regime. CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 5100, 5121, 5132 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982).
217. This would require an amendment to the section in the Code of Civil Procedure
that prohibits the partition of community property. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 872.210(b)
(West 1980). The relief would approximate that available to separated spouses under the
Wisconsin proposal. See 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill 370, Senate Substitute Amendment 1,
§ 766.93(7). No division of debt or provision for a separate property marriage would be
authorized by that bill for cohabiting spouses. Cf. id § 766.93(3)-(4).
218. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1982).
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Additionally, a partition of community property should be author-
ized for good cause in some cases where no other alteration in the
couple's marital property regime is being requested. As discussed in
the section on access,219 this may be a sensible solution when one
spouse, although fiscally responsible, has been effectively precluded
from exercising management powers.
The Right to Participate
As the legal model of marriage has changed from one in which the
husband as head and master made all of the family's financial decisions
to an egalitarian one in which the husband and wife cooperatively
manage their affairs, so has marital property law increasingly reflected
equal roles for the spouses. California's current model requires joint
decisionmaking only in matters of central concern to the family's wel-
fare, otherwise recognizing great freedom for individual action. This
emphasis on equal, not joint, management and control is consistent
with concern for the freedom of transactions. At times, however, it
treads too heavily upon the cooperative model of decisionmaking. Ac-
cordingly, this Article makes several proposals designed to complement
California's existing dual management scheme with protections for the
spouse whose views or needs are not, in fact, taken into account by the
other spouse when management decisions are made.
Joinder
Because joinder rules have long focused on the importance to both
spouses of some management decisions, the existing rules are in large
part appropriate to continuing familial needs. As discussed above,
some relaxing of the formalities as to gifts and sales of personal prop-
erty would be in keeping with current customs.2 2 0 On the other hand,
additional joinder requirements are recommended to increase the like-
lihood that formal title will reflect actual ownership and to ensure joint
decisions in matters of central importance to the family.221 These provi-
sions would control the purchase or sale of a business or a family mo-
bile home, decisions concerning pensions or annuities, and agreements
that the community indemnify or stand as surety for another.
Rights of Access
In certain areas, statutes permit sole management of community
219. See infra notes 222-26 & accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 41-50 & accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 51-56 & accompanying text.
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assets. The provisions that deal with community businesses and bank
accounts are sound and should be retained. 222 They may, however, op-
erate to defeat the practical ability of one spouse to undertake in-
dependent management activities of the kind contemplated by the rule
of equal management and control. A remedy potentially less drastic
than that available to other co-owners, but similar in purpose, should
be provided. Unlike the traditional right to an accounting, which usu-
ally produces both an inventory and a partition of shared assets,
223
there should be a mechanism for relief when no division of any part of
the community property estate is needed. Rather, a spouse who has
been frozen out of an opportunity to manage some appropriate share of
the community's assets should be permitted to request access to desig-
nated funds or property. Because the parties' ownership rights extend
to the undivided whole of their community property, no actual division
of property should be required when only a transfer of management is
at issue.
The request for access might take a number of forms. If funds
were needed to pay an outstanding obligation, the petition might ask
that the managing spouse be directed to apply specified property to its
satisfaction.224 Because there might be need for an order that payment
be made out of the other spouse's separate property, the court's juris-
diction in access cases should extend to all forms of property.225 In
other cases a transfer of property to the petitioner's control might be
requested. In yet others, management might be assured by adding the
second spouse's name to the title of property or to a bank account. 226
The directive of equal management and control should be imple-
mented under a new statute that would authorize such forms of relief
upon a showing of good cause.
Correcting Title
To assure both parties' management rights and to protect their
ownership interests in transactions with third parties, the Wisconsin
proposal would authorize a spouse to petition to have his or her name
added to the title of marital property (community property) held in the
name of the other spouse.227 The provision is sound and should be
222. See supra notes 10-12 & accompanying text.
223. See D. DOBBS, supra note 27, § 4.3, at 252-54.
224. See supra text following note 64.
225. See supra note 66.
226. See infra note 227 & accompanying text.
227. 1981 Wis. Assembly Bill 370, Senate Substitute Amendment 1, § 766.93(6): "When
the title to marital property contains the name of only one spouse, the other spouse may
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added to the California codes.
Marshalling on the Debtor's or the Debtor's Spouse's Behaf
When orders of satisfaction are set by law, a spouse should be per-
mitted to insist that the other spouse and creditors alike respect that
order. If a spouse is unable to make payment voluntarily out of appro-
priate funds because they are not in fact subject to that spouse's man-
agement and control, an action for access to direct the other spouse to
make payment would avoid further steps by the creditor.228 If, how-
ever, such an action is not undertaken and the creditor moves to com-
pel payment, other remedies should be available.22 9 At any point up to
and including the time of levy, a suit or motion should be authorized to
stay the enforcement of judgment against assets that are only seconda-
rily liable, pending execution against sources which are primarily lia-
ble. Of course, a stay would only be granted if the debtor or the
debtor's spouse could identify property that is both primarily liable and
subject to execution. If such marshalling occurs, any attachment al-
ready held by the creditor should be dissolved only after full satisfac-
tion has been received, and it is clear that the creditor's priority in the
event of the debtor's later bankruptcy will not be endangered. 230 In
codifying such protections for the debtor and the debtor's spouse, Cali-
fornia would join those states which recognize that a fair balancing of
interests between creditors and spouses should authorize marshalling
on behalf of the debtor when more than one source of property exists to
satisfy the creditor's claim.231
The Right to Be Made Whole
A spouse who has been injured by the other spouse's unauthorized
request the court for an order directing that the name of the other spouse be placed upon the
title or that the titled spouse change the record title [to] both names." See id § 766.51(2)(e)
(right of third parties to rely on record title). See supra note 54 & accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 64-66 and 224-25 & accompanying text.
229. Interspousal litigation should not be forced. See supra note 5 & infra text following
note 231.
230. Under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, a transfer of property of the debtor made 90
days or less before the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition may be voidable by the
trustee. I1 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. IV 1980). Any marshalling procedures on behalf of the
debtor or the debtor's spouse should be designed to assure the creditor of the protection
ordinarily afforded by an attachment against liable property.
231. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-215(D) (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-11 (1978);
Tax. FAM. CODE AN. tit. 1, § 5.62 (Vernon 1975), discussed supra note 96; see also UNIF.
MARITAL PROPERTY AcT § 9 (May 15, 1982 Discussion Draft). What marshalling rules
should apply on behalf of creditors and how these rules might affect orders of satisfaction
and marshalling as between the spouses are beyond the scope of this Article.
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behavior should be made whole. Yet, in most cases, parties to ongoing
marriages are understandably and properly more concerned with pre-
serving their marriages than with preserving their wealth. To provide
redress for interspousal wrongs while preserving marriages whenever
feasible, the law should recognize that although some spouses may be
prepared to undertake interspousal litigation (and that speedy and fair
relief is called for in such cases), many others are not. A spouse who
fears that asserting property rights will jeopardize his or her marriage
may well defer taking action until the relationship ends. So long as the
decision to postpone litigation does not result in harm to innocent third
parties, the current law, which permits such actions at dissolution of
marriage by either death or divorce, is sound and should be preserved.
An express statement that there is no statute of limitations on a spouse's
right to seek recovery, except as specified in the Family Law Act,
should be added to the Code.
Setting Aside Unauthorized Transactions
The traditional relief for a wrongful transfer has been an action by
the injured spouse to recapture the community property that was uni-
laterally transferred to a third party.2 32 Because a spouse cannot uni-
laterally sever his or her one-half interest in the community property,
suit during an ongoing marriage has resulted in return of the entire
property to the community.233 If, however, recovery is attempted after
the community has been terminated by divorce or the death of one
spouse, only one-half the transferred property normally is recovered.234
This recovery becomes part of the separate property of the injured
spouse, with the transferor's act treated as a continuing one that took
effect upon the termination of the community, when a unilateral parti-
tion of the community property became possible.235
Although the history that produced these distinctions is under-
standable, the analysis is incomplete. First, the transferor should not
be permitted unilaterally to force the partition of an item of community
232. See, e.g., Britton v. Hammell, 4 Cal. 2d 690, 52 P.2d 221 (1935); Novo v. Hotel Del
Rio, 141 Cal. App. 2d 304, 295 P.2d 576 (3d Dist. 1956); Lynn v. Herman, 72 Cal. App. 2d
614, 165 P.2d 54 (4th Dist. 1946).
233. Britton v. Hammell, 4 Cal. 2d 690, 52 P.2d 221 (1935); Lynn v. Herman, 72 Cal.
App. 2d 614, 165 P.2d 54 (4th Dist. 1946); Mathews v. Hamburger, 36 Cal. App. 2d 182, 97
P.2d 465 (2d Dist. 1939).
234. See, e.g., Trimble v. Trimble, 219 Cal. 340, 26 P.2d 477 (1933); Pretzer v. Pretzer,
215 Cal. 659, 12 P.2d 429 (1932); Dargie v. Patterson, 176 Cal. 714, 169 P. 360 (1917).
235. Trimble v. Trimble, 219 Cal. 340, 26 P.2d 477 (1933), as explained in Britton v.
Hammell, 4 Cal. 2d 690, 692, 52 P.2d 221, 222-23 (1935).
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property through the mechanism of an unauthorized transfer of the
whole property, only one-half of which can be recaptured by the other
spouse.2 36 Together, however, the spouses can agree to divide commu-
nity property into separate property interests.23 7 When a wrongful
transfer has been made, therefore, it would be consistent to permit a
wronged spouse who sues the transferee during marriage to make an
election: to insist either upon the restoration of the whole property to
the community (refusing to consent to its alienation, even in part), or to
ratify what could be deemed the other spouse's offer to partition (by
requesting that one-half the property be returned to the injured
spouse's separate property). Indeed, partition might provide greater
protection for an injured spouse, by removing his or her one-half inter-
est from the management reach of a spouse who has already abused the
Code's management powers.
Second, there is little case law discussing the proper measure of
recovery. Where land or property that can be recovered in kind is
transferred, the cases appear to assume that restoration of the property
itself is sufficient.238 If the property has appreciated in value, the in-
jured spouse is unlikely to complain. But if the property's use has
value or if the property has deteriorated in some fashion, questions re-
main. Should the transferee ever be held liable for use? If the property
has depreciated in value, has been exchanged for other property, or has
been consumed, should the transferee nonetheless be compelled to pay
an amount equal to the property's value at the time of the original
transfer? Or, given such depreciation, exchange, or consumption,
should the transferee instead pay the value of the property to which the
alienated property can be traced or the value it would have had if it
were intact at the time of the suit?23 9 Or should these costs be either the
236. The rule precluding partitions of community property by a unilateral act or upon
the demand of one of the spouses, enunciated in Jacquemart v. Jacquemart, 142 Cal. App.
2d 794, 299 P.2d 281 (2d Dist. 1956), has been codified in CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 872.210(b) (West 1980). Its provisions are generally sound. However, amendment to per-
mit a spouse's petition for judicial partition of the community upon a showing of good cause
is recommended supra at note 217 & accompanying text.
237. The issue arises most frequently when community property funds are used to
purchase a home, title to which is taken in joint tenancy. Although the form of title is not
necessarily controlling, joint tenancy ownership, when established, transmutes the commu-
nity property into equal separate property interests that are subject to rights of survivorship.
See, e.g., Schindler v. Schindler, 126 Cal. App. 2d 597, 272 P.2d 566 (2d Dist. 1954).
238. See, e.g., Trimble v. Trimble, 219 Cal. 340, 26 P.2d 477 (1933).
239. In Spreckels v. Spreckels, 172 Cal. 775, 158 P. 537 (1916), the court did not consider
the plaintiffs request that the value of Mrs. Spreckels' interest in the gifts made by her
husband be returned to her estate if the specific property could not be returned, as it con-
cluded that she had ratified the gifts.
MANAGEMENT POWERS AND DUTIESNovember 1982]
responsibility of the transferor or, to some degree, nonrecompensable
losses? Statutory clarification would be useful.
Third, if the transferee has detrimentally relied in good faith upon
the transfer, it is fair to require that the recapture not injure the trans-
feree if the wronged spouse could have acted earlier, thereby avoiding
the harm. Recovery in such cases should be conditioned upon compen-
sation to the transferee for any damages incurred.240
If the Code is amended to require joinder for certain acquisitions
of community property such as businesses and real estate,241 the set-
aside procedure for unauthorized purchases should function in the
same fashion. In this case, the amount paid or promised for the prop-
erty would have been wrongfully alienated and would be subject to
restoration to the community, conditioned upon restitution of the prop-
erty or business to the third party.242
Damages Owed by One Spouse to the Community or to the Other Spouse
A spouse can inflict damage upon the community or the other
spouse in various ways. As just discussed, this may occur through a
transfer made without the joinder of the other spouse, in contravention
of Civil Code section 5125 or 5127. It may also occur when a spouse
exercises permissible management powers that are nonetheless incon-
sistent with the community's interests-for example, by paying a debt
with community funds although his or her existing separate property is
primarily liable. Finally, one spouse may owe the other damages for
personal injuries. When should these injuries be recompensed and in
what fashion?
Since the 1949 decision of Fields v. Michael,243 California law has
240. The author recently was consulted following an elderly woman's request for legal
advice. Her husband, who had heart trouble, had just given the couple's business to his son
from a former marriage. Unwilling to sue for recapture during her husband's lifetime and
possibly endanger his health, what options should be available to her after his death? What
relevance should be attached to the son's expenditure of considerable personal effort in the
business in the meantime? Should it be relevant if he knew that his stepmother could avoid
the gift? Should it make a difference if he knew she could avoid the gift but assumed that
she had chosen not to when nothing was said? Although it would be inequitable to estop the
woman from suing to protect her property once she is widowed, it seems equally harsh to
force a forfeiture on her stepson. If restoration of the property itself would unfairly damage
the transferee, an undivided ownership interest in the property or compensation by way of
damages should be available to the injured spouse.
241. See supra notes 53-54 & accompanying text.
242. Protections should be provided for a bona fide purchaser in good faith without
knowledge of the marriage relation, similar to those currently provided for purchasers of
community property realty. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1982).
243. 91 Cal. App. 2d 443, 205 P.2d 402 (2d Dist. 1949).
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recognized that a spouse, instead of suing a transferee for recapture,
may sue the estate of a deceased transferor for losses incurred through
a wrongful alienation of community property. As the Fields court sug-
gested, similar flexibility should exist during marriage. In effect, the
transferor has injured the community to the extent of the entire amount
alienated or, alternatively, has injured the other spouse to the extent of
that spouse's one-half ownership interest. If recapture from the trans-
feree is not sought, or if it does not fully compensate the injured
spouse's interests (for example, -if the property has use value or has
been partially consumed), an appropriate damage recovery from the
transferor spouse should be available. 24
Further, as outlined above, a statutorily prescribed order of satis-
faction expresses a legislative decision that payment from one or an-
other funding source is preferable for a given debt.245 The policies that
support such rules equally support a right to reimbursement if a fund
has been inappropriately dissipated. However, if payment was not
made from a source of primarily liable funds because no such funds
existed when that the debt fell due, no right to later reimbursement
should arise. In these circumstances, the legislature has decided that it
is appropriate to compensate the third party with other available funds.
In order to encourage the payment of debts as they fall due, avail-
ability at the time of normal payment should be the test. So, for exam-
ple, if a tort victim whose primary source of collection under Civil
Code section 5122 is the tortfeasor's separate property seeks payment at
a time when the tortfeasor has no separate property, payment should be
made from the community property. There should be no right to later
indemnification. The obligation was in essence a support expense met
244. If for example, property has depreciated in value through use that has benefited the
transferee, the rationale of Fields v. Michael would support a combination of remedies: re-
capture from the transferee and damages for the decreased value of the property from the
transferor. In Fields, the court commented that an injured spouse "is entitled to pursue
whatever course is best calculated to give her effective relief. Where the amount of the gifts
and identity of the donees are known, and the property can be readily reached, [recapture]
may be decidedly more advantageous. . . . [Wihere recourse against the donees would be
ineffective to give relief,. .. a denial of [a remedy against the transferor spouse] would...
amount to a concession that the law is powerless to accord to the wife's community interest
the full protection which [the gift section] was evidently designed to ensure. We think the
law is not so toothless." Id at 448-49, 205 P.2d at 406. The court dismissed the contention
that the plaintiff's suit was barred because it could not have been brought against her hus-
band during his lifetime, stating, "[WMe think that a cause of action in favor of plaintiff did
exist prior to [her husband's] death." Id at 450, 205 P.2d at 407.
245. See supra notes 59-69 (third-party tort creditors), 71-76 (prenuptial creditors), 97-99
(contract creditors), 102-11 (support creditors), 128-38 (interspousal tort creditors), 174-95
(interspousal support creditors) & accompanying text.
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with funds then available. Should the tortfeasor later inherit separate
property, that property in turn will be subject to potential support lia-
bilities. Over the lifetime of a marriage, the availability of various
funding sources will fluctuate, but the family can be expected to meet
each day's expenses in light of the family situation at the time. To
attempt a recapitulation of all separate expenses and community ex-
penses at some later point would turn the family's finances into a rec-
ord-keeping nightmare rather than a series of discrete decisions, each
made in light of the current financial situation. Later reimbursement
should be permitted only if a decision is wrongful in terms of funds
then available. Otherwise, bygones should be bygones.
To summarize, a right to damages or reimbursement from one
spouse to the other exists in three circumstances: when one spouse has
received personal injuries for which the other spouse is responsible, 246
when community property has been unilaterally alienated in violation
of a joinder provision, and when a debt has been paid from an inappro-
priate fund according to the Civil Code's orders of satisfaction. If such
damages are owed, their measurement must reflect the dissipated own-
ership interests as well as the nature of the property used for
reimbursement.
As long as one focuses on these two factors, the results can be com-
puted for any set of facts. For example, if a spouse had $5,000 in sepa-
rate property that was primarily liable for a debt, but used $5,000 of
community property instead for its satisfaction, the other spouse will
have been damaged to the extent of his or her one-half interest in the
$5,000 of community property, or to the equivalent extent of $2,500 in
separate property. (This result follows because the other $2,500 that
was transferred represented the tortfeasor's own one-half interest in the
community.)
The injured spouse's recovery, then, could take a number of forms.
First, the tortfeasor could be required to restore the $5,000 to the com-
munity property from his or her separate property, indemnifying the
community for its earlier expense. At this point, the wronged spouse
once again would have a $2,500 interest in the community, and the
tortfeasor, in effect, would have paid the $5,000 of damages out of his
or her own separate property (a $2,500 interest was alienated through
the original $5,000 community property payment and a $2,500 interest
in $5,000 of separate property was later transferred to the injured
spouse's community share). Second, there could be a direct transfer of
246. See supra text accompanying notes 128-38.
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$2,500 from the separate property of the tortfeasor to the separate prop-
erty of the other spouse. Again, the total cost to the tortfeasor would be
$5,000 ($2,500 in ownership of the original $5,000 community property
payment, and $2,500 later to the other spouse), and the wronged spouse
would have recovered $2,500 in separate property, the amount of his or
her ownership interest that was lost when the $5,000 of community
property was dissipated. Third, if the tortfeasor had dissipated his or
her separate property by the time that the reimbursement action was
brought, $5,000 of community property could be transferred to the in-
jured spouse as separate property to recompense the wrong. In effect,
there would then be a partition of $10,000 of the community property,
with $5,000 going to pay the tortfeasor's separate property obligation
and $5,000 becoming the separate property of the nontortfeasor spouse.
This result can also be explained by noting that the original transfer
cost each spouse $2,500, and that the later transfer of $5,000 of commu-
nity property to the wronged spouse constitutes reimbursement of
$2,500 by the tortfeasor, the remaining $2,500 reflecting the share that
the injured spouse already owned in the community.
The same analysis can be applied if, for example, the wrongful act
were an improper unilateral gift of $5,000 in community property by
one spouse to a child of a former marriage. Three remedies would be
possible: transferring $5,000 of the donor's separate property to the
community, paying $2,500 from the donor's separate property to the
damaged spouse's separate property, or transferring $5,000 in other
community property to the separate property of the damaged spouse.
If, on a contrary set of facts, a spouse settled a tort damage claim
with $5,000 of his or her separate property although community prop-
erty was primarily liable and was then in existence,2 47 reimbursement
could be made in either of two ways. First, there could be a transfer of
$5,000 of community property to the tortfeasor's separate property (at a
cost to the other spouse of that spouse's $2,500 one-half interest in the
247. Just as community funds may be mistakenly used to pay a debt for which separate
property was primarily liable, the converse may occur. In either case, it is equally likely that
questions of convenience or circumstance rather than the form of ownership controlled the
payment decision. If gift presumptions are removed, as recommended above, courts will
remain free to find that payments from separate property were intended as gifts to the com-
munity, should the facts so indicate. See supra notes 141-48 & accompanying text. If sup-
port obligations rest upon both community and separate forms of wealth, as also
recommended, the presumption that expenses paid from separate property are intended as
gifts becomes less important. See supra notes 174-79 & accompanying text; See v. See, 64
Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966). Finally, if the definition of community
property is expanded as recommended in Bruch, Derfnition and Division, supra note 39,pas-
sir, the need for such presumptions will decrease still further.
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community property-the amount that should have been used in the
first place), or the nontortfeasor could make a direct transfer of $2,500
from separate property to the separate property of the tortfeasor (re-
ducing the tortfeasor's loss to $2,500-the amount that his or her com-
munity property share should have been decreased through payment of
the damages from $5,000 in community funds). Either form of relief
would decrease each spouse's wealth by $2,500, as contemplated by the
order of satisfaction.
When damage has been done by the improper alienation of com-
munity property funds and more than one payment scheme is possible
on the facts, the injured spouse should be permitted to elect which
funding source should be used and to which fund payment should be
made. As discussed above, damages should be computed as is appro-
priate to that election. If, however, separate property has been mistak-
enly dissipated through no fault of the nonowner spouse, recovery
should come from community property sources to the extent
possible.248
Conclusion
A system of laws that outlines spousal responsibilities for property
management should also provide means for guaranteeing that its provi-
sions will be effective. During marriage or upon its termination, one
spouse or both may wish to have property disputes resolved. A policy
that supports marriage yet seeks to meet these needs requires two char-
acteristics. First, remedies should be available during marriage to
those who wish to pursue them, so that divorce does not become the
only means to protect legitimate property interests. Second, there
should be no prejudice to those who delay litigation because their pri-
mary concern is with the preservation of their marriage. The proposals
set forth in this Article and summarized in the following appendix seek
a balanced approach to the practical issues that arise under California's
system of equal management and control of community property.
248. In these cases, to the extent that community property funds are available, it would
be inequitable to require restitution out of the separate property of the spouse who did not
make the management error. A waiver of this rule would, of course, be possible. Finally,
there will be a small number of cases in which one spouse has damaged the separate prop-
erty interests of the other spouse. Here, too, the same principles should control recovery:
the sources from which recovery is to be made and to which it is to be paid dictate the
amount of damages to be awarded.
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Appendix: Summary of Recommendations
A. The Right to Know
(1) Enact right to disclosure of assets .................... 235
B. The Right to Sound Management
(2) Amend Civil Code § 5125(e) defining good faith
obligation ............................................ 237
(3) Consider amendments to Civil Code §§ 4800(b)(2),
5125, and 5127 concerning remedies at divorce for mis-
management of community property ................. 238
(4) Amend Civil Code § 5125 to remove requirement of
written consent to usual or moderate gifts ............ 239
(5) Amend Civil Code § 5125 to impose joinder require-
ment for the purchase or sale of community property
business .............................................. .241
(6) Amend Civil Code § 5127 to impose joinder require-
ment for the purchase of real property, including a
family mobile home ................................. 241
(7) Amend Civil Code § 5125 to require joinder for exer-
cise of options under pension or annuity plan ........ 242
(8) Consider imposition of joinder requirement as to life
insurance beneficiary designations ................... 242
(9) Amend Civil Code § 5125 to require joinder for con-
tracts of surety, guaranty or indemnity of third parties
...................................................... 242
(10) Amend Civil Code § 5122 to provide that insurance
funds may be used to satisfy indebtedness without re-
gard to policy's ownership ........................... 243
(11) Consider amendments to Civil Code § 5122 to include
order of satisfaction as to quasi-community property. 243
(12) Study danger for long-term impoverishment of a fam-
ily through one spouse's "separate" tort .............. 244
(13) Retain Civil Code § 5122's orders of satisfaction ..... 245
(14) Study possibility of permitting intervention by defend-
ant's spouse in tort cases to obtain bifurcated hearing
on question of appropriate primary liability for dam-
ages judgment ....................................... 245
(15) Amend Civil Code § 5120 to clarify that prenuptial
debts of all kinds are subject to the section and that
current support obligations do not fall within the
section ............................................... 247
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(16) Amend Civil Code § 5120 to impose an order of satis-
faction for payment of prenuptial debts .............. 247
(17) Consider liability of nondebtor spouse's earnings for
prenuptial obligations if no other funds are available to
creditor .............................................. 247
(18) Amend Civil Code § 5118 (and related reference in
§ 4805) to provide that earnings remain community
property after separation in the absence of contrary
agreement or court order ............................ 251
(19) Enact provisions overruling the "lender's intent" test
........................................ 252
(20) Enact order of satisfaction as to nontortious obligations
...................................................... 252
(21) Amend Civil Code § 4800 to permit unequal division of
debt ................................................. 252
(22) Enact orders of satisfaction for support obligations .. 255
(23) Repeal Civil Code § 199 concerning restricted creditor
access by children of former marriages ............... 255
(24) Extend rule of § 4807 to include spousal support
obligations ........................................... 256
(25) Repeal Civil Code §§ 5127.5 and 5127.6 concerning
child support ......................................... 260
(26) Reenact Civil Code § 209 concerning stepparent
support .............................................. 260
(27) Consider amendment to Civil Code § 5113 to include
quasi-community property in the order of satisfaction.
......................................... 261
(28) Amend Civil Code § 5126 to make separate property
damage recoveries subject to reimbursement
requirem ent .......................................... 261
(29) Amend Civil Code § 5113 to clarify damages computa-
tion for interspousal torts ............................ 262
(30) Retain current rule that recognizes informal dealings
between spouses ..................................... 262
(31) Enact provision overruling gift presumptions ........ 267
(32) Clarify reimbursement and apportionment rules ..... 267
(33) Enact rule specifying burden of proof for removal from
commingled funds ................................... 268
(34) Amend Civil Code § 3440 concerning fraudulent con-
veyances to remove interspousal transfers from conclu-
sive presumption ..................................... 270
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(35) Retain current rule that recognizes informal dealings in
relation to third parties .............................. 270
(36) Amend Civil Code §§ 5121 and 5132 to extend support
obligation now codified as to children to spouses .... 271
(37) Amend Civil Code § 5131 and proposed § 5120.030 to
retain normal support rights during informal
separations ........................................... 272
(38) Amend Civil Code § 4800(c) to permit tracing of com-
mingled personal injury damage recoveries .......... 275
(39) Enact mechanism for dispensing with consent on speci-
fied grounds ......................................... 276
(40) Enact authorization for sole management and control
of entire community under court decree on specified
grounds .............................................. 277
(41) Enact authorization for petition for separate property
marriage on specified grounds ....................... 278
(42) Enact provision permitting partition of property and
debt on specified grounds and amend Code of Civil
Procedure § 872.210(b) ............................... 279
C. The Right to Participate
(43) Enact authorization for right of access to property... 280
(44) Enact authorization for correction of title to property
...................................................... 280
(45) Enact provisions for marshalling on behalf of the
debtor or the debtor's spouse ........................ 281
D. The Right to Be Made Whole
(46) Enact provision clarifying statute of limitations for ac-
tions arising under the Family Law Act ............. 282
(47) Enact provision clarifying availability of partial set-
aside as remedy for wrongful transfer ............... 283
(48) Enact provision clarifying damage measures for
wrongful transfers ................................... 283
(49) Enact reimbursement provisions that reflect decisions
made in light of then-available funds ................ 286
(50) Enact provisions clarifying computation of inter-
spousal damage recoveries ........................... 286
(51) Enact provision clarifying from which source recovery
may be had in cases of interspousal damage actions. 288
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